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Introduction 
For several decades the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) has been a fundamental component of finance. The standard CAPM contains only two 
types of risk, the systematic and the unsystematic. The unsystematic risk includes the 
individual stock specific risk that is not correlated with the market and can be eliminated by 
diversification. However, the systematic risk covers the market risks (e.g., recessions or 
interest rates) and is the only return component in the CAPM that cannot be diversified away. 
Nevertheless, Basu (1977), Jegadeesh (1990), and Fama and French (1992) provide empirical 
evidence that cross-sectional return differences even occur by market capitalization, book-
to-market, and past stock returns better known as size effect, value effect, and momentum. 
The momentum anomaly and the consequential suffering from reversal is still one of the most 
examined anomalies in finance literature. Therefore, this dissertation analyzes novel 
momentum approaches in international settings which represent alternatives to the traditional 
momentum approach by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Beside these very well-known anomalies, a large number of return predictive variables has 
been examined in finance literature. For example, McLean and Pontiff (2016) investigate 97 
anomalies based on research history of cross-sectional relations between variables and stock 
returns. In general, there are two famous distinct explanations. On the one hand, Daniel et al. 
(1998) were among the first to present a behavioral model based on investors’ overconfidence 
and on the other hand, Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest a risk-based explanation. A 
substantial role within the behavioral models is played by the measure of investor sentiment. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) developed a sentiment measure for the U.S. equity market and 
present evidence that market-wide sentiment has effects on the cross-section of the expected 
returns. It is quite likely that the sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler is still the most 
applied sentiment measure in finance literature. However, there are a few restrictions and 
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shortcomings of the measure, especially within an international test setting. Recent literature 
implemented a novel approach by measuring investor sentiment directly at the firm level. 
Aboody et al. (2018) demonstrate the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific 
measure for investor sentiment.  This dissertation empirically analyzes the novel approach 
by Aboody et al. (2018) in a broad set of international equity markets. 
Momentum in the literature 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) were among the first to show that past losers outperform 
past winners in the long run. Specifically, they showed that stocks with low returns in the 
past three to five years have higher subsequent returns than vice versa. This effect later 
became known as the reversal effect in the long run.   
The standard momentum approach that is still current today dates back to Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). They show that over a period of three to twelve months, past winners (based 
on the prior twelve-month stock return) outperform past losers, and therefore exhibit 
momentum in the intermediate term. Afterwards, Rouwenhorst (1998) examined momentum 
in a broad set of international equity markets. Besides the proof that momentum is also 
present in twelve sample countries, he points out that international momentum is likewise 
correlated to momentum in the United States. Later studies by Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999) document momentum even within industries; furthermore Asness et al. (2013) deliver 
empirical evidence for momentum across different asset classes. 
However, all momentum anomalies suffer from a return reversal, and specifically the 
momentum premium earned in the first year becomes negative in the subsequent years 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). Blackburn and Cakici (2017) provide further evidence for the 
return reversal pattern in a broad international sample of 23 developed countries. Recently, 
Conrad and Yavuz (2017) invented a method that separated momentum stocks from stocks 
that gain reversal. They argue that when risk-based characteristics such as size and book-to-
market are taken into account by calculating winner and loser portfolios, a separation is 
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possible. Therefore, they construct a MAX momentum strategy that buys small value winners 
and sells large growth losers. Likewise, they build a MIN momentum strategy that buys large 
growth winners and sells small value losers. With their novel approach, they are not only 
able to gain higher momentum profits in the MAX strategy, but also no significant reversal 
occurs within this strategy. In contrast, the MIN strategy produces no momentum profits but 
significant negative returns over longer holding periods.  
Overall, two famous attempts to explain momentum and reversal exist in literature. Daniel et 
al. (1998) explain short-term momentum and long-term reversal observed in a standard 
momentum approach within a behavioral model based on investors’ overconfidence. On the 
downside, Conrad and Kaul (1998) recommend a risk-based explanation for several market 
anomalies (including momentum). Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) object the view, arguing 
that if a risk-based explanation is true, momentum should not suffer from return reversals. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) contradict the risk-based explanations again by explaining that 
the magnitude and the persistence of the momentum anomaly over decades are too strong to 
be explained by risk and therefore favoring a behavioral approach. Recently, Conrad and 
Yavuz (2017) resume this debate again by arguing that stocks with momentum can be 
separated from stocks that gain reversal when risk-based characteristics are considered in the 
selection of winner and loser portfolios. In sum, the debate about whether returns are 
explained by risk factors or interpreted as a measure of mispricing is still ongoing. Thus, 
providing good reason for examining the question in this dissertation.  
Within the overconfidence explanation an extensive body of literature documents theoretical 
evidence that momentum leads to higher trading volume. Initially, Odean (1998) 
demonstrated that trading volume increases when investors are overconfident. Furthermore, 
Statman et al. (2006) provide supporting evidence for higher trading volume in conjunction 
with biased self-attribution. Recent literature by Byun et al. (2016) resumes these findings 
and provides a novel measure that offers the possibility to use trading volume as a proxy for 
overconfidence, and therefore predict future stock returns. As the direction of overreaction is 
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not known, they argue that the trading volume itself does not predict future stock returns 
directly. Therefore, by multiplying the trading volume with the sign of the average stock 
return, they create a measure for continuing overreaction that displays a trend of investors’ 
overconfidence.   
Investor sentiment and overnight returns in the literature 
In their pioneering work, Baker and Wurgler (BW hereafter) (2006) challenge the view of 
the classical finance theory of efficient markets. They were among the first who demonstrated 
significant effects of investor sentiment on the cross-section of stock returns. Specifically, 
when sentiment is high, stocks that are more attractive for optimistic investors (e.g., stocks 
that were small, young, more volatile or unprofitable) gain low returns in the subsequent 
months while during low sentiment periods, this pattern becomes insignificant or even 
reverses. Besides the well-known BW sentiment measure, a broad set of literature focuses on 
market-wide measures for investor sentiment (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2004 or Stambaugh et 
al., 2012). However, there is less international sentiment literature and no universal measure 
is available (Baker et al., 2012). Furthermore, the BW measure uses the exclusive datasets 
for IPOs from Jay Ritter’s website, which delivers data primarily for the U.S. market. Thus, 
proxies have to be used for international calculations. 
Aboody et al. (2018) contribute to the U.S. literature by implementing a novel approach for 
a firm-specific sentiment measure. More precisely, they document the suitability of overnight 
returns as a measure of sentiment. Their new approach has the advantage that it is possible 
to measure sentiment directly at the firm level, and not as a market wide measure. Besides 
that, the calculations do not require special datatypes or databases, as the opening and closing 
prices are publicly available data.  
Literature on overnight returns is quite young and mainly focuses on U.S. studies. Branch 
and Ma (2008) find a negative correlation between overnight returns and subsequent intraday 
returns. Berkman et al. (2012) deliver supporting evidence and show that this relation is due 
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to a high opening price compared to the intraday prices. Furthermore, they show this behavior 
is stronger among stocks that are more attractive to retail investors and stocks that are harder 
to value. Analyzing microsecond tick data, Lou et al. (2019) present new evidence about the 
cross-section of expected returns by paying particular attention to the exact time the returns 
accrue. Therefore, they evince that momentum profits on U.S. markets occur entirely 
overnight while the profits of all other trading strategies occur intraday.  
In addition, sentiment against the background of different market anomalies is of special 
interest. Particularly because Stambaugh et al. (2012) demonstrate that a broad set of 
anomalies is stronger among high levels of sentiment, and weaker within low sentiment 
levels, while in their test setting the short leg is always more profitable than the long leg. 
Contribution of this thesis 
On the whole, there is still an ongoing debate about the explanation for the momentum 
anomaly and return reversal as well as about sentiment measures as a perennial issue of 
finance literature. However, previous literature predominantly focuses on the U.S. equity 
market, while studies on the European stock market as well as international studies are scarce. 
This dissertation fills this gap and contributes to the literature by examining momentum 
anomalies and sentiment measures on a European or even an international stock market 
sample. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in manifold ways. First, it sheds light into separating 
momentum stocks from stocks that suffer from reversal. Second, it examines a measure for 
overreaction that better predicts momentum stocks than a standard momentum approach. And 
third, it examines the suitability of overnight returns as a firm specific sentiment measure on 
the international stock market. This dissertation investigates different subsamples, i.e. time, 
size and regions. Besides that, different states of the economy, i.e. market volatility, market 
states, investor sentiment, market liquidity, default spread and a recession indicator are taken 
into account.  
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Previous literature often focuses on portfolio sorts to examine how average returns vary 
within different levels of the characteristics. This might be a very useful approach, but 
portfolio sorts have the potential shortcoming that some of the information is lost through 
aggregation. Therefore, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology, which provides a test 
setting that easily allows for multiple control variables, is used additionally.  Recent literature 
by Fama and French (2015) argues that the explanatory power of alternative factor models is 
superior or at least equal to the explanatory power of traditional models (e.g., the three-factor 
model by Fama and French (1993) or the four-factor model by Carhart (1997)). These models 
enable gaining valuable new insights into the cross-section of expected stock returns by 
studying the stocks at the individual firm level. 
This thesis comprises three studies. The subsequent section gives a brief overview of the 
approach and the contribution of every single article to the literature. The remainder of this 
thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 cover the three studies, and Chapter 5 
outlines the main findings of the three studies and summarizes the thesis. 
Separating Momentum from Reversal in International Stock Markets 
It is well established that momentum portfolios suffer from a return reversal over longer 
holding periods. This paper demonstrates that stocks with momentum can be separated from 
those with reversal when risk-based expected return characteristics like firm size and book-
to-market are taken into account in the selection of winners and losers.  
Specifically, this study contributes to the literature by investigating the novel strategies in the 
broad cross-section of international firms drawn from 20 developed non-U.S. equity markets. 
More precisely, what is examined is whether a strategy that buys small value winners and 
sells large growth losers, namely the MAX strategy, yields significantly larger benchmark-
adjusted returns over holding periods up to one year, than the MIN strategy, that buys large 
growth winners and sells small value losers. To ex ante separate momentum stocks from 
stocks that display return reversal, the return behavior of the MAX and MIN strategies over 
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longer holding periods up to three years is further investigated. Given that the well-known 
firm characteristics used in this study can be interpreted as measures of mispricing (e.g., 
Lakonishok et al, 1994; Shleifer and Vishney, 1997; Hirshleifer and Jiang, 2010), that may 
add to our understanding of the varying return behavior of the MAX and MIN strategies. 
Therefore, it is examined whether the performance of the two distinct strategies are the 
outcome of cross-sectional mispricing. 
Continuing Overreaction: European Evidence 
Building upon the insights that continuing overreaction causes momentum in the short run, 
Byun et al. (2016) construct a completely novel measure of continuing overreaction. 
Motivated by their findings for the stock market in the United States, this study extends these 
findings for the European stock market.  
In detail, this study contributes to the literature by examining the novel continuing 
overreaction measure introduced by Byun et al. (2016) in the broad cross-section of 15 
European equity markets. Besides the past stock return, the measure includes the trading 
volume of a stock. First, this study tests whether a positive return relation exists between 
firms with a high measure of continuing overreaction and firms with lower continuing 
overreaction values. Second, the return behavior within the cross-section and added 
established return determinants is investigated. And third, it is tested whether the return 
premium is also present within different business conditions, as it is known that the 
momentum profits vary within different states of the economy. Therefore, the measure is 
tested in contracting/pessimistic business conditions and compared to expanding/optimistic 
business conditions.  
Overnight Returns: An International Sentiment Measure 
This study focuses on the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific sentiment measure 
in an international stock market sample. Previous literature by Aboody et al. (2018) finds 
strong evidence that overnight returns function as a measure of sentiment on the U.S. stock 
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market. The substantial contributions for the international equity markets are interesting 
especially for three reasons. First, there is still no ubiquitous sentiment measure at the firm-
level. Second, until now, international literature has to use U.S. sentiment measures as 
proxies. And third, the existing measures mostly require special datatypes. The novel 
approach fills this gap and offers an international applicable measure. 
Furthermore, to examine the suitability on the international stock market, the study first 
investigates whether overnight returns persist over the subsequent weeks. Second, it is 
examined whether the short-term return persistence is greater among stocks that are 
objectively harder-to-value. For the validity of the assumption, the overnight return 
persistence should be stronger among firms that are objectively harder-to-value. In the third 
step, the return behavior of stocks with high overnight returns in the long run is examined. 
Temporary mispricing is a characteristic that would be expected of a sentiment measure; 
consequently, in the long run, returns should be smaller among firms with high overnight 
returns. Finally, to examine the validity of overnight returns as a firm-specific sentiment 
measure, they are tested in the context of the momentum anomaly, and even the explanatory 
power beyond the well-known BW market-wide sentiment measure is investigated. 
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Separating Momentum from Reversal in International Stock 
Markets 
This research project is joint work with Christian Walkshäusl and Ulrich Wessels. The paper 
has been published as: Christian Walkshäusl, Florian Weißofner and Ulrich Wessels (2019), 
Separating Momentum from Reversal in International Stock Markets, Journal of Asset 
Management 20(2): 111-123. 
 
Abstract Taking into account expected return characteristics like firm size and book-to-
market in the selection of winners and losers helps to ex ante separate stocks with momentum 
from those that exhibit reversal in international equity markets. A strategy that buys small 
value winners and sells large growth losers generates significantly larger momentum profits 
than a standard momentum strategy, is robust to common return controls, and does not suffer 
from return reversals for holding periods up to three years. The superior performance of the 
strategy is attributable to a rather systematic exploitation of cross-sectional mispricing among 
momentum stocks. 
 
Keywords Momentum; Reversal; Return predictability; Mispricing; International markets 
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2.1 Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the momentum effect has become one of the most examined 
return patterns in finance. In their seminal work, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) demonstrate 
that a strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers produces large abnormal returns 
for holding periods up to one year. Since then, the momentum effect has been documented 
in international equity markets, within industries, and across different asset classes 
(Rouwenhorst, 1998; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Asness et al., 2013). However, over 
longer holding periods, momentum portfolios, in general, suffer from a return reversal 
pattern, i.e., the abnormal returns earned over the first year after portfolio formation reverse 
or even turn negative in subsequent years (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001; Blackburn and 
Cakici, 2017). 
Despite the enormous body of literature on the momentum effect, explanations for the return 
behavior of momentum stocks remain an ongoing debate. Daniel et al. (1998) were among 
the first to present a behavioral model based on investors’ overconfidence that explains the 
short-term return continuation and long-term return reversal patterns of typical momentum 
strategies. Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest a risk-based explanation that is, however, 
contradicted by Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) who argue that momentum portfolios should 
not suffer from return reversals if the risk-based interpretation is correct.1 
Recently, Conrad and Yavuz (2017) take up again this debate by arguing that stocks with 
momentum can be separated from those that exhibit reversal when risk-based expected return 
characteristics like firm size and book-to-market are taken into account in the selection of 
winners and losers. Assuming that these firm characteristics are responsible for differences 
in expected returns (Fama and French, 1992), they construct two distinct momentum 
strategies that differ in their underlying risk characteristics. The MAX momentum strategy 
takes a long position in high-risk winners, i.e., small value winners, and a short position in 
 
1  See, Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) for an extended review of the literature. 
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low-risk losers, i.e., large growth losers. Analogously, the MIN momentum strategy goes 
long in low-risk winners (large growth winners) and short in high-risk losers (small value 
losers). 
Studying the U.S. equity market, Conrad and Yavuz (2017) find that the MAX strategy does 
not only yield larger momentum profits than the standard momentum strategy in the short 
run, it also does not display significant return reversals for holding periods beyond one year. 
In contrast to that, the MIN strategy produces no significant momentum profits in the short 
run but suffers from substantial and significant return reversals in the long run. Thus, short-
term return continuation and long-term return reversals are not necessarily linked. Taking 
into account expected return characteristics like firm size and book-to-market in the selection 
of winners and losers helps to ex ante separate stocks with momentum from those that exhibit 
reversal. 
The approach of Conrad and Yavuz (2017) seems to be related to the style momentum of 
Chen and DeBondt (2004) who propose a strategy that goes long in firms with in-favor styles, 
e.g., being small value stocks, and short in firms with out-of-favor styles, e.g., being large 
growth stocks, based on the past price performance of these style characteristics. However, 
there exist clear differences. First, Chen and DeBondt (2004) document in their study that 
style momentum is distinct from pure price momentum by showing that both strategies 
possess unique information about subsequent stock returns that is not captured by the other 
strategy. Second, though the MAX and MIN strategies also take into account firm size and 
book-to-market in the selection of winners and losers, the focus of these strategies is on using 
these characteristics as risk measures for separating high-risk from low-risk momentum 
stocks. Consequently, the strategies’ long and short legs are uniformly defined. In contrast, 
the long and short leg portfolios of style momentum strategies can potentially also consist of 
mid-cap blend-style stocks or non-dividend-paying stocks, which are not in the center of 
attention of the MAX and MIN strategies. Third and finally, while the motivation of Chen 
and DeBondt (2004) is the improvement of style rotation strategies with respect to firm size 
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and value/growth, the MAX and MIN strategies are motivated by the idea that momentum 
can be separated from reversal for constructing enhanced momentum-based investment 
strategies. 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by studying the findings of Conrad and Yavuz 
(2017) outside the United States. As with any finding in empirical research, the 
decomposition of momentum and reversal could be the result of data snooping in the sense 
of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and therefore be sample-specific. To address this concern, we 
independently examine in this study the novel MAX and MIN strategies in the broad cross-
section of international firms drawn from 20 developed non-U.S. equity markets. Obtaining 
results similar to the previous U.S. evidence in Conrad and Yavuz (2017) would strengthen 
their findings and may lead to a better understanding of the momentum and reversal return 
patterns across equity markets. 
From the previous U.S. evidence, we derive three hypotheses that we test out-of-sample in 
non-U.S. equity markets. The first hypothesis directly addresses whether international stock 
returns conform to the same pattern observed in the United States. 
H1: A strategy that buys small value winners and sells large growth losers, the MAX strategy, 
yields significantly larger benchmark-adjusted returns over holding periods up to one year 
than a strategy that buys large growth winners and sells small value losers, the MIN strategy.  
Showing that the short-term performance of the MAX strategy is superior to the MIN strategy 
is only the first part of the key results of Conrad and Yavuz (2017). Second and even more 
important may be the finding that considering expected return characteristics like firm size 
and book-to-market in the selection of winners and losers helps to ex ante separate 
momentum stocks that display return reversals from those that do not. Therefore, we further 
investigate the return behavior of the MAX and MIN strategies over longer holding periods 
up to three years and formulate our second hypothesis as follows. 
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H2: Over holding periods beyond one year, the MAX strategy displays no return reversal, 
while the MIN strategy exhibits significant return reversal. 
The distinct return behavior of the MAX and MIN strategies may be attributable to the 
varying underlying risks associated with different levels of firm size and book-to-market, as 
argued by Conrad and Yavuz (2017). However, these well-known firm characteristics can 
also be interpreted as measures of mispricing (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1994; Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1997; Hirshleifer and Jiang, 2010). Though Conrad and Yavuz (2017) reject that 
the level of market-wide mispricing as measured by market states and the investor sentiment 
is influential in the results observed, they do not rule out explanations based on cross-
sectional mispricing. That is, the possibility that the different return behavior of the two 
strategies is the result of a rather systematic exploitation of existing mispricing among 
momentum stocks that is induced by taking into account mispricing-related measures like 
firm size and book-to-market in the stock selection procedure. Because mispricing at the 
individual firm level may add to our understanding of the varying return behavior of the 
MAX and MIN strategies, we formulate our third and final hypothesis as follows. 
H3: The strong performance of the MAX strategy and the weak performance of the MIN 
strategy are the outcome of cross-sectional mispricing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and 
variables used in this study. The subsequent sections test the outlined hypotheses and present 
the empirical results. The final section concludes the paper. 
2.2 Data and summary statistics 
The dataset used in this study consists of an international sample of firms from 20 developed 
non-U.S. equity markets. Our sample selection resembles the countries included in the well-
known EAFE (Europe, Australia, and the Far East) stock market benchmark from MSCI 
which measures the foreign stock market performance outside of North America. We collect 
monthly total return data on common stocks from Datastream and firm-level accounting 
Chapter 2   Separating Momentum from Reversal in International Stock Markets 
 
 
14 
information from Worldscope. To ensure that accounting information is known before the 
returns are calculated, we match the latest accounting information for the fiscal year ending 
in the previous calendar year with stock returns from July of the current year to June of the 
subsequent year throughout the paper. All data are denominated in U.S. dollars. To ensure 
that tiny or illiquid stocks do not drive our results, we follow Ang et al. (2009) and exclude 
very small firms by eliminating the 5% of firms with the lowest market equity in each 
country. In addition, as in Fama and French (1992), we also exclude firm-year observations 
with negative book equity and financial firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes between 6000 and 6999. The sample period is from July 1990 to June 2017 (henceforth 
1990-2017), and the sample comprises on average 7652 firms per month. Distributional 
statistics for the sample firms across countries are given in Panel A of Table 2.1. 
The variables used in this study are defined as follows. A firm’s size (SZ) is its market equity 
(stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) measured as of June each year 
in million U.S. dollars. Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of book equity to market equity at 
the fiscal year-end. Momentum (MOM) is the cumulative prior six-month stock return, 
skipping the most recent month (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Following Fama and French 
(2015), operating profitability (OP) is revenues minus cost of goods sold and interest 
expense, all divided by book equity.2 Investment (INV) is the annual change in total assets 
divided by lagged total assets. To proxy for systematic mispricing in the later analysis, we 
employ a financing-based misvaluation measure that is based on Bradshaw et al.’s (2006) 
external financing (XFIN) variable. XFIN is the sum of net equity financing and net debt 
financing divided by lagged total assets. Net equity financing is the sale of common and 
preferred stock minus the purchase of common and preferred stock minus cash dividends 
 
2  We do not include selling, general and administrative expenses, as this item is not broadly available among 
international firms. The return predictability of operating profitability is, however, not affected by this 
adjustment. 
Chapter 2   Separating Momentum from Reversal in International Stock Markets 
 
 
15 
paid. Net debt financing is the issuance of long-term debt minus the reduction in long-term 
debt.3 
Table 2.1  Summary statistics, 1990-2017 
Panel A: Sample countries 
Country Firms Country Firms 
 
Australia 
 
745 
 
Japan 
 
2631 
Austria 56 Netherlands 109 
Belgium 79 New Zealand 68 
Denmark 97 Norway 114 
Finland 85 Portugal 49 
France 530 Singapore 311 
Germany 523 Spain 98 
Hong Kong 490 Sweden 233 
Ireland 39 Switzerland 144 
Italy 159 United Kingdom 1092 
 
Panel B: Variables 
Variable Mean 25th Median 75th 
 
SZ 
 
955 
 
40 
 
126 
 
464 
BM 0.96 0.40 0.72 1.21 
MOM 0.05 -0.14 0.01 0.18 
OP 0.74 0.25 0.52 0.92 
INV 0.16 -0.04 0.05 0.18 
XFIN 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the countries included in the international (EAFE) sample 
and the variables used in this study. Panel A reports the average number of firms per month in each 
country over the sample period from July 1990 to June 2017. Panel B reports the mean, 25th 
percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the variables. Firm size (SZ) is market equity (stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) as of June of each year in million U.S. dollars. Book-
to-market (BM) is the ratio of book equity to market equity at the fiscal year-end. Momentum (MOM) 
is the cumulative prior six-month stock return, skipping the most recent month. Operating profitability 
(OP) is revenues minus cost of goods sold and interest expense, all divided by book equity. Investment 
(INV) is the annual change in total assets divided by total assets. External financing (XFIN) is the 
sum of net equity financing and net debt financing divided by lagged total assets. Net equity financing 
is the sale of common and preferred stock minus the purchase of common and preferred stock minus 
cash dividends paid. Net debt financing is the issuance of long-term debt minus the reduction in long-
term debt. 
 
3  In line with Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010), we do not include the change in current debt, as it does not reflect 
market timing. 
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Panel B of Table 2.1 summarizes the distributional statistics of the variables over the 1990-
2017 sample period. A typical firm in our international sample has a size of $955 million in 
terms of market equity, an average relative valuation based on book-to-market of 0.96, and a 
mean past six-month return of 5%. 
2.3 Abnormal returns of MAX and MIN strategies 
In this section, we test hypothesis H1 that the MAX strategy yields larger benchmark-
adjusted returns than the MIN strategy. To do so, we examine the returns to winners and 
losers on the MAX and MIN strategies at the individual firm level using the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) methodology and conduct differences-of-means tests on the average 
coefficient estimates from the regressions. For comparison purposes, we also include the 
standard momentum strategy in the analysis to gauge the strength of the MAX and MIN 
momentum premiums in relation to the unconditional momentum investing approach in 
international equity markets. 
In particular, we estimate three different specification variants nested within the following 
firm-level cross-sectional regression, where the future twelve-month holding period return 
of firm i in month t is regressed on two binary indicator variables, denoted Long and Short, 
in conjunction with common controls that are all available before the month in which the 
return measurement begins: 
 
ri,t = a0,t + a1,tLongi,t + a2,tShorti,t + a3,tln(SZi,t) + a4,tBMi,t + a5,tOPi,t + a6,tINVi,t +  
Country Dummiesi,t + ei,t. 
(2.1) 
 
We apply Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics here and in all subsequent regressions 
to correct for the holding period overlap in the statistical inference (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993). An indicator variable takes the value of one if the underlying condition holds for a 
firm and zero otherwise. For the standard momentum strategy, Long and Short are equal to 
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one if the firm’s past six-month return is in the top or bottom tercile of the MOM distribution, 
respectively. Thus, the long leg describes winners, while the short leg denotes losers. When 
studying the MAX and MIN strategies, the indicator variables also take into account the 
firm’s size and book-to-market ratio as expected return characteristics in line with Conrad 
and Yavuz (2017). For the MAX strategy, Long is equal to one if the firm has a past-six 
month return in the top tercile of the MOM distribution and simultaneously a firm size in the 
bottom tercile of the SZ distribution and a book-to-market ratio in the top tercile of the BM 
distribution. Thus, classifying the firm as a small value winner. On the other hand, Short is 
equal to one if the firm has a past-six month return in the bottom tercile of the MOM 
distribution and simultaneously a firm size in the top tercile of the SZ distribution and a book-
to-market ratio in the bottom tercile of the BM distribution. Thus, classifying the firm as a 
large growth loser. For the MIN strategy, the indicator variables are defined in an analogous 
manner using the tercile classifications based on SZ, BM, and MOM. In particular, Long is 
here equal to one if the firm is a large growth winner and Short is equal to one if the firm is 
a small value loser.4 
Taking into account the most recent developments in asset pricing (Fama and French, 2015), 
the set of common control variables includes firm size, book-to-market, operating 
profitability, and investment for measuring benchmark-adjusted returns. Except for MOM, 
which is updated monthly, the other explanatory variables are updated each June. 
Furthermore, since we combine firms from multiple countries in the analysis, we include 
country dummies here and in all subsequent regressions to control for possible country 
effects. 
 
 
 
4  For each variable, we use the full SZ, BM, and MOM distribution across all sample firms, so that the stock 
selection procedure corresponds to independent sorts on the three variables, as in Conrad and Yavuz (2017). 
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Table 2.2  Benchmark-adjusted returns of standard, MAX, and MIN momentum strategies 
 Regression Estimates Difference-of-Means Tests 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (2) – (1) (3) – (1) (2) – (3) 
Strategy Standard MAX MIN    
       
Long 1.74 3.63 1.65 1.89 -0.09 1.98 
 (2.58) (4.89) (1.43) (3.16) (-0.13) (2.21) 
Short -1.83 -3.70 0.45 -1.87 2.28 -4.15 
 (-1.56) (-3.20) (0.52) (-3.35) (2.97) (-4.26) 
SZ -0.37 -0.08 -0.29 0.29 0.08 0.21 
 (-1.86) (-0.34) (-1.35) (4.09) (2.43) (2.78) 
BM 2.96 2.78 3.26 -0.18 0.31 -0.48 
 (4.98) (4.58) (5.32) (-2.99) (2.13) (-3.36) 
OP 1.50 1.55 1.53 0.04 0.02 0.02 
 (8.90) (8.98) (8.92) (1.30) (0.97) (1.56) 
INV -2.82 -2.82 -2.94 -0.01 -0.12 0.11 
 (-4.40) (-4.29) (-4.52) (-0.14) (-1.71) (2.73) 
       
R² 0.14 0.14 0.14    
       
Long-Short 3.57 7.34 1.20 3.76 -2.38 6.14 
 (2.24) (4.16) (0.78) (5.90) (-3.45) (6.17) 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions along with difference-of-means 
tests on the average coefficients between the strategies. The dependent variable is the firm’s future 
twelve-month stock return. Long and Short are binary indicator variables that take the value of one if 
the underlying condition holds for a firm and zero otherwise. Depending on the considered strategy, 
the conditions are defined as follows. Standard (Long: winner, Short: loser), MAX (Long: small value 
winner, Short: large growth loser), MIN (Long: large growth winner, Short: small value loser). The 
classification of firms is based on terciles using the SZ, BM, and MOM distributions. The additional 
independent variables are firm size (SZ), book-to-market (BM), operating profitability (OP), and 
investment (INV) and all regressions include country dummies. R² is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
The last row provides the average return premium associated with the given strategy in percent per 
year based on the difference between the long and short leg coefficient estimates. 
 
Table 2.2 presents average coefficient estimates from the outlined firm-level cross-sectional 
regression setting for the standard, MAX, and MIN momentum strategies along with 
difference-of-means tests to assess whether the strategies produce significantly different 
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momentum profits. The last row provides the economic and statistical significance of the 
average return premiums associated with the three strategies based on the difference between 
the long and short leg coefficient estimates. 
To begin with, specification (1) reports the results for the standard momentum strategy. As 
indicated by the average coefficient estimates on Long and Short, past winners are associated 
with significantly positive subsequent returns (1.74% per year), while past losers are 
associated with subsequent negative returns (-1.83% per year). Though the strategy’s short-
leg return is statistically somewhat weaker over the sample period, the spread in average 
returns is sufficient to obtain a significant (long-short) standard momentum premium of 
3.57% per year after controlling for firm size, book-to-market, operating profitability, and 
investment. 
Specifications (2) and (3) report the results for the novel MAX and MIN strategies. When 
the MAX strategy is considered, where the long leg consists of winners with high expected 
return characteristics (small and value) and the short leg is based on losers with low expected 
return characteristics (large and growth), the attainable momentum premium is economically 
and statistically greatly enhanced and amounts now to more than 7.34% per year. The average 
return premium is here equally driven by the strategy’s long leg (3.63% per year) as well as 
by the short leg (-3.70% per year). In contrast, when the MIN strategy is considered, where 
the long leg consists of winners with low expected return characteristics (large and growth) 
and the short leg is based on losers with high expected return characteristics (small and 
value), the attainable momentum premium is with its value of 1.20% per year statistically not 
reliably different from zero. 
Comparing our international results to the previous U.S. evidence in Conrad and Yavuz 
(2017) indicates, in general, a similar return behavior across equity markets. In a related 
analysis that also controls for the Fama and French (2015) benchmark variables, they report 
significant MAX momentum premiums of 1.01% per month over the strategy’s first six 
months and 0.59% per month over the subsequent six-month period, which correspond to 
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about 10.03% on an annual basis (formally, (1+0.0101)6 x (1+0.0059)6 - 1) over their 1965-
2010 sample period. For the MIN strategy, they report insignificant premiums of 0.11% per 
month over the first six months and -0.23% over the following six months, which correspond 
on average to -0.72% per year. 
The estimates on the control variables echo in general prior results in the literature and 
corroborate their importance as cross-sectional return determinants in non-U.S. equity 
markets. International stock returns are significantly positively associated with book-to-
market and operating profitability, while they are significantly negatively related to 
investment. In contrast, we do not find that firm size has significant power predicting returns 
during the sample period. This result is, however, also in line with recent international 
evidence (e.g., Fama and French, 2012, 2017). 
The difference-of-means tests in the last three columns show that the average return 
premiums associated with the MAX and MIN strategies are significantly different from the 
standard momentum premium and to each other. Relative to the standard strategy, the return 
spread between winners and losers is noticeably more pronounced when small value winners 
and large growth losers are considered (MAX), while it is less pronounced when large growth 
winners and small value losers constitute the strategy (MIN). Finally, the difference between 
the MAX and MIN momentum premiums is statistically highly significant and amounts to 
more than 6.14% per year.  
An inspection of the individual difference-of-means tests reveals that both legs of the MAX 
strategy significantly contribute to its superior overall performance, regardless of which of 
the other two strategies is used for comparison. 
Since the MAX strategy appears to be the most promising of the three from an investment 
perspective, we further investigate the strategies’ turnover and potential transaction costs to 
shed light on practical implementation issues. To begin with, though momentum-based 
investment strategies are often implemented with monthly rebalancing in the literature, we 
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primarily focus in our analysis on the performance over a twelve-month holding period to 
identify strategies that do not require frequent rebalancing in order to lower transaction costs. 
Examining the turnover (across the long and short leg portfolios) of the standard, MAX, and 
MIN momentum strategies in terms of unique stock additions and removals, we find on 
average values of 33.63%, 39.56%, and 36.67% per year, respectively.5 However, since we 
study the strategies based on Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions which are analogous to 
creating equal-weighted portfolios, the annual rebalancing to equal weights could potentially 
increase the turnover to 100% per year.6 Does this circumstance eliminate the superior 
performance of the MAX strategy after accounting for corresponding transaction costs? 
We address this question by employing the novel insights of Frazzini et al. (2018) who have 
analyzed over 1.7 trillion dollars of executed trades across 21 developed equity markets over 
a 19-year period from AQR Capital, a large institutional asset manager that is well-known 
for its scientific and factor-based investing approach. Though their cost measures fully take 
into account bid-ask spreads, market impact costs, and commissions, they find that real-world 
trading costs are much smaller compared to the – typically assumed – costs used in previous 
studies.7 For instance, realized trading costs for long or short positions in non-U.S. stocks are 
on average 0.11% or 0.22% and range for small stocks from 0.23% (long) to 0.27% (short). 
Using for simplicity the largest magnitude of 0.27% regardless of the given order type and 
an annual turnover of 100%, the roundtrip costs would only amount to 0.54% per year which 
seems negligible in light of the MAX strategy’s abnormal return of 7.34% per year. 
Up to this point, our full sample results fall right in line with our first hypothesis. To further 
assess the robustness of our findings across time, firm size, and regions, we repeat our cross-
 
5  These magnitudes are similar to the average turnover of value-weighted U.S. momentum strategies (34.5%) 
that do not rebalance stocks to initial weights (Novy-Marx and Velikov, 2016). 
6  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that even when equal-weighted portfolios are used for momentum 
strategies, the average turnover is usually less than 100%. They report an average value of 84.8% on their 
strategy. 
7  The most important determinant of trading costs is the price impact, as bid-ask spreads and trading 
commissions do not scale with trading size. 
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sectional regression analysis for the MAX and MIN strategies in two different sub-periods, 
among small and large firms, and in three different regions (Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Japan). 
The corresponding results are presented in Table 2.3, where Panel A shows estimates for the 
MAX strategy and Panel B shows estimates for the MIN strategy. 
Table 2.3  Robustness of MAX and MIN momentum strategies 
Panel A: MAX momentum strategy 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample All All Small Large Asia-Pac Europe Japan 
Period Earlier Later Full Full Full Full Full 
        
Long 3.67 3.59 3.19 2.04 1.99 4.34 -1.01 
 (3.25) (4.26) (3.49) (2.15) (0.99) (4.08) (-1.41) 
Short -2.53 -4.87 -3.70 -2.66 -7.48 -4.87 -0.39 
 (-1.67) (-3.17) (-3.43) (-2.35) (-4.61) (-3.36) (-0.42) 
SZ 0.02 -0.17 -1.70 0.57 -1.59 0.28 -0.14 
 (0.05) (-0.92) (-4.53) (1.94) (-2.51) (1.07) (-0.38) 
BM 3.64 1.93 2.29 3.59 3.91 3.27 4.87 
 (3.59) (4.29) (4.56) (4.08) (3.70) (3.93) (5.32) 
OP 1.38 1.72 1.44 1.57 6.00 1.44 1.02 
 (6.00) (7.78) (7.32) (7.34) (4.66) (6.30) (5.04) 
INV -3.25 -2.40 -2.81 -1.88 -2.29 -2.96 5.57 
 (-2.88) (-5.48) (-4.10) (-2.45) (-2.34) (-3.73) (1.41) 
        
R² 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.04 
        
Long-Short 6.20 8.47 6.89 4.70 9.48 9.21 -0.61 
 (2.55) (3.77) (4.01) (2.46) (2.97) (3.93) (-0.46) 
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Panel B: MIN momentum strategy 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample All All Small Large Asia-Pac Europe Japan 
Period Earlier Later Full Full Full Full Full 
        
Long 1.51 1.79 0.90 0.89 3.99 2.62 -1.94 
 (0.86) (1.38) (0.90) (0.89) (2.58) (2.24) (-1.67) 
Short -0.41 1.32 0.55 -0.86 1.44 -1.40 0.81 
 (-0.31) (1.47) (0.48) (-0.85) (0.66) (-1.25) (1.00) 
SZ -0.22 -0.36 -2.02 0.36 -1.83 -0.00 -0.04 
 (-0.62) (-2.00) (-6.01) (1.41) (-3.01) (-0.02) (-0.11) 
BM 4.37 2.15 2.69 4.06 4.08 3.98 4.50 
 (4.56) (3.95) (5.17) (4.59) (3.67) (4.51) (4.86) 
OP 1.37 1.69 1.44 1.54 5.66 1.40 1.04 
 (5.86) (7.89) (7.25) (7.20) (4.34) (6.18) (5.12) 
INV -3.38 -2.50 -2.91 -1.94 -2.52 -3.12 5.36 
 (-3.04) (-5.65) (-4.27) (-2.53) (-2.49) (-3.94) (1.39) 
        
R² 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.05 
        
Long-Short 1.93 0.47 0.35 1.75 2.55 4.03 -2.74 
 (0.90) (0.24) (0.24) (1.06) (1.22) (2.02) (-1.72) 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s future twelve-month stock return. See Table 2.2, for a description of the independent variables. 
R² is adjusted for degrees of freedom. The last row provides the average return premium associated 
with the given strategy in percent per year based on the difference between the long and short leg 
coefficient estimates. The earlier and later half samples cover July 1990 to December 2003 and 
January 2004 to June 2017, respectively. The small (large) sub-sample consists of the bottom (top) 
50% of firms in each country in terms of market equity, measured as of June of each year. Asia-Pac 
includes Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore. With the exception of Japan, Europe 
encompasses the remaining sample countries (see Panel A of Table 2.1). 
 
Specifications (1) and (2) report sub-period results. The earlier sub-period runs from July 
1990 to December 2003 (162 months), while the later sub-period is from January 2004 to 
June 2017 (162 months). As documented by the average return premiums on the MAX and 
MIN strategies, the influence of the expected return characteristics on the realized momentum 
profits is persistent in the earlier and more recent half of the sample period. The MAX 
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momentum premium is large and significantly present in both sub-periods, while the MIN 
momentum premium remains insignificant across time. 
A further cause for concern for anomalous return patterns is their pervasiveness across size. 
Though we control for a possible size effect in the cross-section of average returns by 
including firm size as one of the control variables, it is interesting to know whether our main 
findings hold across small firms as well as large firms. To address this question, 
specifications (3) and (4) report size-segmented sub-sample results.8 The sub-sample of small 
(large) firms consists of the bottom (top) 50% of firms in each country in terms of market 
equity, measured as of June of each year. Though the MAX momentum premium is 
somewhat more pronounced among smaller firms, as it is the case for most other return 
anomalies, it is not limited to small firms but also significantly present among the largest and 
economically most important firms in international equity markets. In contrast, we do not 
find that the MIN strategy produces significant momentum profits among small firms or large 
firms. 
Finally, specifications (5) to (7) provide regional evidence by dividing the EAFE 
international sample into three major regions in line with Fama and French (2012, 2017). 
Asia-Pacific includes Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore. With the 
exception of Japan, which represents a region of its own, Europe encompasses the remaining 
sample countries (see Panel A of Table 2.1). We observe that the MAX momentum premium 
is strong in terms of economic and statistical significance among Asian-Pacific and European 
equity markets. On the other hand, we do not find that taking into account expected return 
characteristics like firm size and book-to-market in the selection of winners and losers 
 
8  To be consistent with the intended size segmentation, the MAX and MIN strategies use tercile classifications 
based on the SZ, BM, and MOM distributions among the bottom or top 50% of firms and not across all 
sample firms. 
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produces significant momentum profits in Japan.9 This result is, however, consistent with 
Asness (2011) and others who have documented that momentum-based investment strategies 
do not seem to work among Japanese firms. The regional results for the MIN strategy 
corroborate in general our international cross-country findings of insignificant momentum 
profits on this type of strategy. The only exception is Europe, where the MIN momentum 
premium tends to be statistically significant, but in terms of its economic magnitude, it is still 
less than half of the corresponding European MAX momentum premium. 
After having addressed the robustness of our main findings across time, firm size, and 
regions, we further study the MAX and MIN momentum premiums conditional upon 
business conditions. It is well known that the profits of momentum strategies vary with the 
general state of the economy. They tend to be large during expanding/optimistic states and 
small during contracting/pessimistic states (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2011). To address 
whether the MAX and MIN strategies conform to the same pattern observed for standard 
momentum strategies, we estimate firm-level cross-sectional regressions based on equation 
(1) for two different specification variants that differ in the underlying state of the economy, 
i.e., contracting/pessimistic versus expanding/optimistic. We measure the two economic 
states using six different proxies based on market volatility, market states, investor sentiment, 
market liquidity, default spread, and the NBER recession indicator. The first two measures 
are based on international EAFE data, while the remaining measures are based on U.S. data 
in lack of appropriate cross-country proxies. The use of U.S.-based variables outside the 
 
9  In light of this finding, we also have tested whether Japanese firms are influential in our inference that the 
MAX strategy is superior to the MIN strategy in international equity markets. For instance, the weighting of 
Japanese firms in the international MAX and MIN strategies could be responsible for the observed return 
difference. First, the average share of Japanese firms in the long leg portfolios is with values of 25.99% 
(MAX) and 25.09% (MIN) very similar across the two strategies. Only the short leg portfolios show on 
average a greater exposure to Japanese firms for the MAX strategy of 37.98% in comparison to 25.16% for 
the MIN strategy. Second, replicating the performance analysis for the MAX and MIN strategies in an 
international sample that excludes Japan (EAFE ex Japan) in analogy to Table 2, yields an average MAX 
momentum premium of 10.23% per year (t-statistic of 4.45) and an average MIN momentum premium of 
2.24% per year (t-statistic of 1.32). Thus, the lack of momentum profits among Japanese firms cannot account 
for the inference that the MAX strategy is superior to the MIN strategy. 
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United States can be motivated by Baker et al. (2012) who show that sentiment is contagious 
across countries and particularly driven by the U.S. sentiment. Furthermore, Rapach et al. 
(2013) document that the United States possesses, as the world’s largest and most important 
equity market, a leading role for international markets. 
The proxies are defined as follows. Market volatility is the annual standard deviation of the 
value-weighted EAFE market portfolio returns over the 12 months prior to the beginning of 
the strategies’ holding period (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Following Cooper et al. (2004), 
the market state is measured based on the cumulative return on the value-weighted EAFE 
market portfolio over the 36 months prior to the beginning of the strategies’ holding period. 
To capture investor sentiment, we rely on the monthly U.S. sentiment index constructed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006).10 To measure market liquidity, we employ Hu et al.’s (2013) 
noise index, which is based on the aggregate noise in the prices of U.S. Treasury bonds, i.e., 
the differences between market and model-implied yields.11 In light of the fact that the U.S. 
Treasury bond market is one of the most active and liquid markets in the world and one with 
the highest credit quality, the level of noise in this market can be used as a market-wide 
measure of liquidity. In line with Fama and French (1993), the default spread is the monthly 
difference between the yield on an index of 10-year U.S. corporate bonds and 10-year U.S. 
Treasury bonds.12 Finally, the NBER recession indicator for the United States is used to 
separate crisis from non-crisis periods over the sample period. Except for market states and 
the NBER recession indicator, the median of the given economic state proxy over the sample 
period is used to define periods of low and high values on that measure. Positive (negative) 
36-month market returns separate up (down) market states. 
 
10  The sentiment index is available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/. The 
index time series runs until September 2015. 
11  The noise index is available at Jun Pan’s website: http://www.mit.edu/~junpan/. The index time series runs 
until December 2016. The data is provided on a daily basis. We employ the index’s daily end-of-month 
values for our analysis. 
12  An appropriate U.S. corporate bond index is available in Datastream from April 2002 on. 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the average return premiums associated with the standard, MAX, and 
MIN momentum strategies during contracting/pessimistic business conditions (black bars) 
and expanding/optimistic business conditions (clear bars), as measured by the six different 
economic state proxies (Panels A to F). As before, the premiums are derived from the 
differences between the long and short leg coefficient estimates from the outlined firm-level 
cross-sectional regression setting that includes common return controls and country 
dummies. 
First, regardless of the applied economic state proxy, the standard and MAX strategies are 
associated with significantly positive average return premiums during expanding/optimistic 
periods. Across the six proxies, the average momentum profits here amount to 5.56% per 
year on the standard strategy and 9.57% per year on the MAX strategy. During 
contracting/pessimistic periods, we do, however, not find that the standard and MAX 
momentum premiums are statistically significantly different from zero. The MIN momentum 
premium is in general insignificant in both states of the economy. The only two exceptions, 
where we find significantly positive momentum profits on this type of strategy are periods 
of low market volatility and after positive 36-month market returns (up markets). 
Second, conducting difference-of-means tests on the strategies’ average momentum profits 
during a given economic state corroborates our previous inference on the superiority of the 
MAX strategy. Regardless of the applied economic state proxy and irrespective of the given 
economic state, the differences between the MAX and standard momentum premiums are 
always significantly positive and statistically significant. The same is true for the differences 
between the MAX and MIN momentum premiums. Hence, the MAX strategy is superior in 
comparison to the standard and MIN momentum strategies during contracting/pessimistic as 
well as expanding/optimistic periods. Comparing the MIN strategy relative to the standard 
strategy, we observe that the differences in premiums are persistently significantly negative 
during expanding/optimistic periods, while they are in general insignificant during 
contracting/pessimistic periods.  
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Figure 2.1  Momentum premiums conditional upon business conditions 
Panel A: Market volatility 
 
Panel B: Market states 
 
Panel C: Investor sentiment 
 
Panel D: Market liquidity 
 
Panel E: Default spread 
 
Panel F: NBER recession indicator 
 
This figure illustrates the average return premiums associated with the standard, MAX, and MIN 
strategies in percent per year during contracting/pessimistic business conditions (black bars) and 
expanding/optimistic business conditions (clear bars), as measured by six different economic state 
proxies (Panels A to F). 
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In sum, the results in this section are consistent with hypothesis H1. Similar to the prior U.S. 
evidence, we observe that the MAX strategy produces significantly larger benchmark-
adjusted returns than the MIN strategy and the standard momentum strategy in non-U.S. 
equity markets over holding periods up to one year. 
2.4 Longer holding period returns 
Following the insights of Conrad and Yavuz (2017), we test in this section hypothesis H2 
that the MAX strategy displays no return reversal, while the MIN strategy exhibits significant 
return reversal over holding periods beyond one year. To explore whether their U.S. findings 
carry over to international equity markets, we estimate different firm-level cross-sectional 
regressions nested within equation (1), where the dependent variable now is the longer 
holding period return computed over the second and third year after the measurement of the 
strategies’ underlying firm characteristics. 
Table 2.4 presents average coefficient estimates from the outlined firm-level cross-sectional 
regression for the two year-to-year holding periods. The results document that selecting 
winners and losers conditional upon their expected return characteristics based on firm size 
and book-to-market also has a major impact on the behavior of longer holding period returns. 
While the MAX strategy yields strong momentum profits in the first year (see Table 2.2), it 
does not display significant return reversals in the following two years. The average 
coefficient estimates on Long and Short as well as the resulting (long-short) MAX 
momentum premium are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is in sharp contrast 
to the MIN strategy which does not produce significant momentum profits in the first year 
but suffers from substantial return reversals in the subsequent years. The average MIN 
momentum premium is -4.83% per year in the second year and -3.70% in the third year. As 
indicated by significantly positive short-leg returns, the reversal is primarily driven by the 
rebound of the strategy’s short leg that generates benchmark-adjusted returns of around 3% 
per year. 
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Table 2.4  Longer holding period returns of MAX and MIN momentum strategies 
 MAX momentum strategy MIN momentum strategy 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Return 2nd Year 3rd Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
Long -0.71 -0.81 -1.45 -1.00 
 (-1.08) (-1.06) (-1.86) (-1.50) 
Short 0.12 0.72 3.38 2.70 
 (0.11) (0.74) (4.85) (4.11) 
SZ -0.25 -0.14 -0.13 -0.02 
 (-1.18) (-0.71) (-0.64) (-0.12) 
BM 2.14 1.81 1.81 1.54 
 (3.81) (3.15) (3.32) (2.98) 
OP 1.18 1.09 1.18 1.10 
 (7.17) (5.74) (7.21) (5.82) 
INV -1.73 -0.83 -1.72 -0.75 
 (-3.20) (-1.30) (-3.16) (-1.18) 
     
R² 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
     
Long-Short -0.84 -1.52 -4.83 -3.70 
 (-0.52) (-1.13) (-4.13) (-3.59) 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s second-year or third-year return after the measurement of the strategies’ underlying firm 
characteristics. See Table 2.2, for a description of the independent variables. R² is adjusted for degrees 
of freedom. The last row provides the average return premium associated with the given strategy in 
percent per year based on the difference between the long and short leg coefficient estimates.  
 
Taken together, the results in this section strongly support hypothesis H2. Short-term return 
continuation and long-term return reversals are not necessarily linked. Taking into account 
expected return characteristics like firm size and book-to-market in the selection of winners 
and losers helps to ex ante separate momentum stocks that display return reversals from those 
that do not. 
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2.5 A mispricing-based explanation 
In this section, we test our final hypothesis H3 that the strong performance of the MAX 
strategy and the weak performance of the MIN strategy are the outcome of mispricing. Even 
though Conrad and Yavuz (2017) argue in favor of a risk-based explanation, they do not rule 
out the possibility that the varying MAX and MIN momentum premiums may be attributable 
to cross-sectional mispricing. In particular, they only study whether the U.S. premiums are 
related to market states and investor sentiment. Lagged market returns and the investor 
sentiment index are commonly used as market-wide proxies for mispricing that reflect 
aggregate investor confidence or risk aversion which may cause delayed overreaction among 
investors and therefore provide an explanation for the observed momentum pattern in average 
stock returns. However, both explanations fall short to explain the MAX and MIN 
momentum premiums. Though the level of market-wide mispricing may explain the varying 
strength of the momentum premium across time, existing mispricing at one point in time can 
also vary across firms (Hirshleifer and Jiang, 2010; Walkshäusl, 2016). 
Following this reasoning, we explicitly investigate the aspect of cross-sectional mispricing 
as an explanation for the significantly different return behavior of the MAX and MIN 
strategies. To proxy for systematic mispricing, we employ the firm’s external financing 
behavior as measured by Bradshaw et al.’s (2006) XFIN variable. Positive values on XFIN 
indicate issues, while negative values indicate repurchases. The opportunistic financing 
hypothesis (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995) suggests that firms issue 
additional capital when prices are high and repurchase outstanding capital when prices are 
low. Thus, issues (repurchases) provide signals of potential overvaluation (undervaluation) 
based on the management’s private assessment of the firm’s intrinsic value relative to the 
market. Thus, if cross-sectional mispricing drives the return behavior of the MAX and MIN 
strategies, the realized momentum profits on the two strategies should consequently differ 
when the underlying momentum stocks are either perceived as overvalued or undervalued. 
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To examine whether the observed return premiums on the MAX and MIN strategies are 
attributable to the systematic exploitation of cross-sectional mispricing, we estimate firm-
level cross-sectional regressions based on equation (1) for two different specification variants 
that differ in their underlying stock samples. Specification (1) excludes winners that are also 
issuers and losers that are also repurchasers, thus, representing overvalued winners and 
undervalued losers. Specification (2) excludes winners that are also repurchasers and losers 
that are also issuers, thus, denoting undervalued winners and overvalued losers. The firms 
excluded from the corresponding samples are identified each month by their monthly-
updated MOM characteristic and their XFIN characteristic which is measured each June. By 
constraining the underlying stock samples in this way, we obtain groups of firms, where the 
perceived mispricing of winners and losers is in general favorable (specification (1)) or 
unfavorable (specification (2)) for momentum strategies that exploit cross-sectional 
mispricing. 
Table 2.5 presents average coefficient estimates from the two outlined firm-level cross-
sectional regression variants using holding period returns computed over the first, second, 
and third year after the measurement of the strategies’ underlying firm characteristics. Panel 
A shows estimates for the MAX strategy and Panel B shows estimates for the MIN strategy. 
For the sake of brevity, the estimates on the common control variables are not tabulated. 
The results document that cross-sectional mispricing plays an important role in 
understanding the return behavior of MAX and MIN strategies. In line with our previous 
findings, the MAX strategy produces a significantly positive momentum premium in the first 
year and no significant return reversals in the following two years when the unfavorably-
mispriced winners and losers are excluded from the sample (specification (1)). However, this 
inference changes considerably when the favorably-mispriced winners and losers are left out. 
In specification (2), the MAX momentum premium is rendered insignificant in the first year, 
and the strategy now suffers from substantial return reversals in the second and third year. 
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Table 2.5  Returns to MAX and MIN momentum strategies conditional on mispricing 
Specification (1) (2) 
Excluding Overvalued winners & undervalued losers 
Undervalued winners & 
overvalued losers 
Return 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
 
Panel A: MAX momentum strategy 
Long 6.29 1.94 0.37 1.41 -2.26 -3.41 
 (5.66) (1.90) (0.33) (1.29) (-2.84) (-3.26) 
Short -5.75 -2.93 -1.35 -1.57 1.60 1.47 
 (-4.70) (-2.33) (-1.11) (-1.33) (1.41) (1.81) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R² 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
       
Long-Short 12.04 4.87 1.73 2.98 -3.86 -4.88 
 (5.51) (2.47) (0.88) (1.56) (-2.47) (-3.42) 
 
Panel B: MIN momentum strategy 
Long 2.73 0.21 0.07 0.58 -2.87 -1.66 
 (2.94) (0.31) (0.10) (0.47) (-3.31) (-1.83) 
Short -2.13 1.61 2.22 1.80 5.80 4.79 
 (-1.39) (1.23) (1.52) (1.25) (4.81) (5.03) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R² 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 
       
Long-Short 4.85 -1.40 -2.15 -1.21 -8.67 -6.45 
 (2.56) (-0.85) (-1.32) (-0.63) (-5.74) (-5.46) 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s first-year, second-year or third-year return after the measurement of the strategies’ underlying 
firm characteristics. The common control variables are untabulated, see Table 2.2, for a description. 
The sample in specification (1) excludes overvalued winners and undervalued losers, while the 
sample in specification (2) excludes undervalued winners and overvalued losers. Misvaluation is 
identified by the firm’s external financing behavior, where negative values on XFIN denote 
undervaluation and positive values on XFIN denote overvaluation. R² is adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. The last row provides the average return premium associated with the given strategy in 
percent per year based on the difference between the long and short leg coefficient estimates. 
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Analogously, the previously found poor performance of the MIN strategy turns strong when 
the unfavorably-mispriced winners and losers are excluded from the sample, as done in 
specification (1). The strategy then yields significantly positive momentum profits in the first 
year and exhibits no significant return reversals in the subsequent years. In contrast, when 
the favorably-mispriced winners and losers are discarded in specification (2), the MIN 
strategy reveals its weak performance with strong return reversals in the second and third 
year. 
Taken together, the results in this section strongly support hypothesis H3. The realization of 
the superior performance on the MAX strategy and the occurrence of the inferior 
performance on the MIN strategy is strongly dependent on cross-sectional mispricing. The 
varying performance of the MAX and MIN strategies among favorably-mispriced and 
unfavorably-mispriced winners and losers furthermore suggests that firm size and book-to-
market may rather be proxies for cross-sectional mispricing than risk-based expected return 
characteristics. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we test the U.S. findings of Conrad and Yavuz (2017) that stocks with 
momentum can be ex ante separated from those that exhibit reversal by taking into account 
characteristics like firm size and book-to-market in the selection of winners and losers. We 
provide strongly supportive out-of-sample evidence on the previous U.S. findings in the 
broad cross-section of international firms drawn from 20 developed non-U.S. equity markets 
over the sample period from 1990 to 2017. 
A strategy that buys small value winners and sells large growth losers, denoted the MAX 
strategy, generates significantly larger momentum profits than a standard momentum 
strategy, is robust to common return controls, and does not suffer from return reversals for 
holding periods up to three years. In contrast, a strategy that buys large growth winners and 
sells small value losers, denoted the MIN strategy, produces no significant momentum profits 
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but significant return reversals over holding periods beyond one year. Consistent with the 
view that firm size and book-to-market can also be interpreted as measures of mispricing, the 
significantly different return behavior of the MIN and MAX strategies is attributable to a 
rather systematic exploitation of cross-sectional mispricing among momentum stocks. The 
superior performance of the MAX strategy is driven by undervalued winners and overvalued 
losers, while the inferior performance of the MIN strategy is driven by the fact that the 
strategy’s underlying stock selection procedure picks overvalued winners and undervalued 
losers. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
36 
              
Continuing Overreaction: European Evidence 
This research project is joint work with Ulrich Wessels. The paper has been submitted to the 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance and is currently under review. 
 
Abstract This paper tests Byun, Liam and Yun (2016) continuing overreaction measure 
using weighted signed volumes in European equity markets. As in the U.S., firms with high 
measures of continuing overreaction outperform firms with low measures. The observed 
premium is even higher than within a standard momentum approach and does not suffer from 
return reversal for holding periods up to three years. Furthermore, the observed premium is 
robust to common controls, such as firm size, book-to-market and momentum, as well as 
more recent controls for investment and operating profitability. Within different business 
conditions, the novel measure has a clear superiority towards momentum especially during 
contracting/pessimistic periods. 
 
Keywords Momentum; Trading volume; Return predictability; Continuing overreaction; 
International markets   
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3.1 Introduction  
It is well established that overconfidence can explain a broad set of anomalies all around the 
globe. Specifically, the research goes back to Daniel et al. (1998), who demonstrate that the 
overconfidence of investors and their biased self-attribution can explain overreactions as well 
as underreactions in international stock markets. They argue that in the course of 
overestimation of their own abilities investors overvalue private information and underreact 
to public information signals. However, if a later public signal confirms the private 
information thus good (bad) news supports the investor’s buy (sell) decision, his confidence 
rises and leads to biased self-attribution. Or to put it in a simple way: past returns predict 
future returns, and as a consequence short-run momentum and long-term reversals arise.1  
Building upon the insight that continuing overreaction causes momentum in the short run, 
Byun et al. (2016) construct a completely novel measure of continuing overreaction (CO 
hereafter). They argue if CO causes momentum as argued by Daniel et al. (1998) a more 
direct CO measure can predict future returns better than past returns and the results are even 
stronger within stocks held primarily by investors leaning towards biased self-attribution. To 
calculate the continuing overreaction measure they use weighted signed volumes and the 
direction of investor’s overreaction indicated by the sign of stock returns.  
The results of Byun et al. (2016) are interesting especially for two reasons. First, the premium 
based on the innovative continuing overreaction measure is economically significant and 
actually larger than the premium of a standard momentum approach. The CO premium stays 
significant even when they control for momentum while inversely momentum disappears 
when CO is taken into account. In addition, in line with prior momentum literature (e.g., 
Asness, 2011) they cannot find significant CO premium for the Japanese equity market due 
to missing biased self-attribution. Second, Byun et al. (2016) provide a direct support of the 
 
1  For the well-known momentum effect on the U.S. equity market see Jegadessh and Timan (1993, 2001) and 
e.g., Rouwenhorst (1998), Chui et al. (2010) or Asness et al. (2013) for non-U.S. evidence. 
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Daniel et al. (1998) model that overconfidence and biased self-attribution leads to 
overreactions and a better estimation of stock return predictability. 
A broad set of literature already demonstrated theoretical evidence that overconfidence leads 
to higher trading volume. Odean (1998) demonstrates that trading volume increases when 
investors are overconfident and described it as the most robust effect of overconfidence.2 
Barber and Odean (2001) provide empirical evidence that men are more overconfident than 
women are and thus trade more excessively. Furthermore, Statman et al. (2006) also find 
supporting evidence on the theoretical models of higher trading volume as a result of biased 
self-attribution by Gervais and Odean (2001).3 
Byun et al. (2016) argue that trading volume can be used as a proxy for overconfidence, but 
the trading volume itself does not predict future stock returns, because the direction of 
overreaction is not known. Therefore, they multiply the trading volume with the sign of the 
average stock return in the given time period. Specifically, if the stock return is negative 
(positive) the signed volume has a negative (positive) sign as well. Additionally, Byun et al. 
(2016) take the weighted sum of signed volumes and simultaneously give a larger weight the 
more recent the signed volume is to the point where CO is calculated.4 As a consequence, the 
novel CO measure displays a trend of investors overconfidence in the examined time.   
Given that the study mentioned above mainly focuses on the U.S. equity market, but 
momentum and continuing overreaction is also present outside the USA (Rouwenhorst, 1998; 
Chui et al., 2010; Fama and French, 2012; Asness et al., 2013), we contribute in the present 
paper to the literature by studying the novel CO measure in European equity markets for the 
first time. As with any finding in empirical research, the CO measure could be the result of 
data snooping in the sense of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and therefore be sample specific. 
Given that empirical financial research mostly focuses on the U.S. market (Karolyi, 2016), 
 
2  Benos (1998) also exhibits a theoretical model where the trading volume increases with the number of 
overconfident traders in the stock market. 
3  For further empirical evidence see e.g., Glaser and Weber (2009) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009). 
4  Statman et al. (2006) also use signed volume and examine it within a time series test setting.  
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testing former U.S. results in non-U.S. markets is important to enhance the quality of the 
return predictability literature as well as to guard against data snooping. To address this 
concern, we independently examine in this study the relation between CO measures and 
subsequent stock returns in the broad cross-section of European firms drawn from 15 
developed non-U.S. equity markets. As European equity markets provide fresh data, our non-
U.S. analysis provides a useful out-of-sample test on the significance of the CO measure 
around the world. 
Following the previous U.S. evidence, we develop three hypotheses that we test out-of-
sample in foreign European equity markets. The first hypothesis addresses whether European 
stock market returns sorted on the innovative CO measure conform to the same pattern 
observed in the United States. 
Hypothesis 1: A significantly positive relation exists between the firm’s continuing 
overreaction measure and subsequent stock returns. 
Showing that a positive return relation exists between firms with high CO measures and firms 
with low CO does, however, not rule out the possibility that the identified return behavior is 
simply a manifestation of already known return effects. Therefore, we examine in the second 
hypothesis whether the return effect is pervasive in the presence of various return predictors. 
Hypothesis 2: The return difference between firms with the strongest CO measure and firms 
with the lowest CO measure is not subsumed by established cross-sectional determinants. 
On the one hand, we control for the traditional return effects based on firm size and book-to-
market (Fama and French, 1992). Taking into account the most recent developments in asset 
pricing on the other hand, we also control for the novel benchmark variables associated with 
operating profitability and investment that have been proposed by Fama and French (2015) 
for a comprehensive description of the cross-section of average stock returns. Besides that, 
we also test whether a momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) drives out the 
observed premium.  
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Hypothesis 3: The return premium between firms with high and low CO measures is also 
present within different business conditions. 
As it is well known that momentum profits vary with the state of the economy, we test the 
CO measure in contracting/pessimistic business conditions and compare it to 
expanding/optimistic business conditions. As different measures, we use market volatility, 
market states, investor sentiment, market liquidity, default spread, and the NBER recession 
indicator. 
Our results are easily summarized. Similar to the United States, the CO measure is suitable 
as an international measure for continuing overreaction. First, we find a significant and 
positive return premium between stocks with high and low CO measures for about one year 
after portfolio formation that becomes insignificant afterwards but does not turn into reversal. 
Second, the return premium cannot be explained by established cross-sectional determinates 
and even a momentum factor cannot explain the premium. Third, CO premium is also 
available during different states of the economy. 
Taken together, our out-of-sample analysis strongly supports the CO measure constructed by 
Byun et al. (2016). The continuing overreaction measure provides a newly and more direct 
measure even on the European stock markets. Furthermore, the results improve the quality 
of literature regarding return predictability in the sense of Daniel et al. (1998) across equity 
markets.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and 
variables used in this study. The subsequent sections test the outlined hypotheses and present 
the empirical results. The final section concludes the paper. 
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3.2 Data and summary statistics 
We study a European stock market sample that consists of firms from 15 developed markets, 
namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Our sample 
selection mirrors the countries included in the well-known European stock market benchmark 
form MSCI. We collect monthly total return data on common stocks from Datastream and 
firm-level accounting information from Worldscope. To make sure that accounting 
information is known before the returns are calculated, we match the latest accounting 
information for the fiscal year ending in the previous year with stock returns from July of the 
current year to June of the subsequent year. All data are denominated in U.S. dollars. To 
ensure that our results are not driven by tiny or illiquid tocks, we follow Ang et al. (2009) 
and exclude the 5% of firms with the lowest market equity in each country. In addition, as in 
Fama and French (1992) firm-year observations with negative book equity are excluded from 
the sample as well as financial firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
between 6000 and 6999. The sample period is from July 1990 to June 2018.  
Following Byun et al. (2016) we calculate the continuing overreaction measure as follows. 
The signed volume (SV#,%) for stock i in month t is defined as the sum of the trading volume 
which is the number of shares traded in month i multiplied by the stock price. Furthermore, 𝑟',( is the stock return for firm i in the given month t. 
 
 
To calculate CO, in line with Byun et al. (2016) we assign increasing weights to signed 
volumes that means the more recent a month the higher the weight of the signed volume. In 
detail, as we use a 1-year formation period for CO calculation throughout the paper, the 
SV#,% = *TV#,%											if	𝑟',( > 0,0																	if	𝑟',( = 0,−TV#,%							if	𝑟',( < 0  (1) 
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weight for the most recent month is 12 while the penultimate month is weighted with 11 and 
so forth until month t-12 that is one year ago and therefore weighted with 1. We normalize 
the signed volume, taking the sum of the weighted values and divide it by the average trading 
volume over the same period of 12 months. 
 CO#,% = sum(w: ∗ SV#,%<=, … ,w? ∗ SV#,%<?)mean(VOL#,%<=, … , VOL#,%<?)  (2) 
Table 3.1  Summary statistics, 1990-2018 
Panel A: Sample countries 
Country Firms Country Firms 
    
Austria 56 Netherlands 109 
Belgium 79 Norway 114 
Denmark 97 Portugal 49 
Finland 85 Spain 98 
France 530 Sweden 233 
Germany 523 Switzerland 144 
Ireland 39 United Kingdom 1092 
Italy 159   
 
Panel B: Variables 
Quintile SIZE BM OP INV MOM 
      
Low CO 798 0.78 0.83 0.22 -0.19 
2 1267 0.75 0.83 0.19 -0.05 
3 1430 0.75 0.86 0.18 0.08 
4 1434 0.75 0.85 0.17 0.22 
High CO 937 0.79 0.88 0.18 0.49 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the countries included in the European sample and the 
variables used in this study. Panel A reports the average number of firms per month in each country 
over the sample period from July 1990 to June 2018. Panel B reports the quintiles sorted on the 
continuing overreaction measure. Firm size (SZ) is market equity (stock price multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding) as of June of each year in million U.S. dollars. Book-to-market (BM) 
is the ratio of book equity to market equity at the fiscal year-end. Operating profitability (OP) is 
revenues minus cost of goods sold and interest expense, all divided by book equity. Investment (INV) 
is the annual change in total assets divided by total assets. Momentum (MOM) is the cumulative prior 
six-month stock return, skipping the most recent month. 
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Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the total number of firm-year observations for the countries 
included in the European sample. On average, our sample includes 3407 firms. In line with 
their importance for the European stock market, the largest portion falls on the countries UK, 
France, and Germany. 
The variables used in this study are defined as follows. A firm’s size (SZ) is its stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, calculated as of June of each year in million 
U.S. dollars. Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of book equity to market equity at the fiscal 
year-end. Momentum (MOM) is the cumulative prior twelve-month stock return, skipping 
the most recent month (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Following Fama and French (2015), 
investment (INV) is the annual change in total assets divided by lagged total assets. Operating 
profitability (OP) is revenues minus cost of goods sold and interest expense, all divided by 
book equity. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 summarizes the distributional statistic for the variables used in this 
study. A typical firm in the high (low) CO quintile of our European sample has a size of 937 
(798) and a book-to-market ratio of 0.79 (0.78). Naturally, the momentum factor is much 
stronger (0.49) in the high quintile than in the low one (-0.19).  
3.3 The CO-return relation 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 1 that firms with a strong CO measure have higher 
subsequent stock returns than firms with a weak CO measure, culminating in the existence 
of a positive continuing overreaction–return relation. To examine how European stock 
returns vary with different levels of CO measure, we begin our analysis at the portfolio level. 
Specifically, at the end of each month, we form quintile portfolios by allocating stocks in 
ascending order to five groups based on their continuing overreaction measure from the 
previous month. Accordingly, a firm is assigned to the high (low) quintile portfolio if its CO 
measure is in the top (bottom) 20 percent of the CO measures. Monthly returns are calculated 
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for different holding periods from 1 up to 12 months after portfolio formation, portfolios are 
rebalanced each month.  
Table 3.2  Continuing overreaction portfolios 
Quintiles 1 Month 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
Low CO 0.09 0.32 0.71 0.79 
2 0.40 0.55 0.77 0.84 
3 0.60 0.72 0.79 0.84 
4 0.96 0.86 0.80 0.80 
High CO 1.36 1.06 0.73 0.71 
     
High - Low 1.27 0.74 0.02 -0.08 
 (9.37) (7.37) (0.23) (-1.00) 
 
This table presents average monthly raw returns in percent for quintile portfolios sorted on continuing 
overreaction measure. The portfolios are formed every month by allocating stocks in ascending order 
to five groups based on their continuing overreaction measure from the previous month. The last row 
(High-Low) provides the average spread return between firms with high and low continuing 
overreaction measures. The t-statistic is given in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.2 shows average monthly raw returns sorted on the continuing overreaction measure. 
The last row (High-Low) reports the spread return between firms with high and low 
continuing overreaction measures for testing whether the return difference is significantly 
different from zero. We observe that the portfolio returns ascend monotonically from firms 
with low CO to firms with high CO. For a one month holding period the H-L spread is 
statistically highly significant and amounts to 1.27 percent per month (t-statistic 9.37). 
Similar to the well-known momentum effect, we observe significant H-L returns for a 
holding period of up to 12 months with 0.74 percent per month (t-statistic 7.37). While 
momentum suffers from significant reversal after a one-year holding period, the portfolio 
formation on continuing overreaction displays no significant reversal even for a holding 
period of up to 36 months after portfolio formation.5 It is notable that the High CO portfolio 
 
5  For the reversal effect see e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
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has significant positive returns for all observed holding periods. This is in sharp contrast to a 
standard momentum approach where the long side normally turns negative at the latest after 
a one-year holding period.  These findings are mainly in line with Byun et al. (2016) who 
could not find return reversal within the U.S. equity market either.  
Table 3.3  Robustness of CO measure  
High - Low 1 Month 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
(1) 1.24 0.64 -0.28 -0.39 
Earlier (5.40) (3.89) (-2.06) (-3.09) 
(2) 1.30 0.83 0.32 0.23 
Later (9.00) (7.36) (3.28) (2.46) 
(3) 1.52 0.84 0.08 -0.11 
Small (11.74) (9.01) (0.88) (-1.16) 
(4) 1.11 0.66 0.02 -0.08 
Large (6.81) (5.42) (0.16) (-0.93) 
 
This table presents average monthly raw returns in percent and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) 
sorted on the continuing overreaction measure. For clarity we only show the High-Low average return 
spread here. The earlier and later half samples cover July 1990 to June 2004 and July 2004 to June 
2018, respectively. The small (large) sub-sample consists of the bottom (top) 50% of firms in each 
country in terms of market equity, measured as of June of each year.  
 
Hitherto the results support our first hypothesis that there exists a positive relation between 
continuing overreaction and subsequent stock returns. To further examine the robustness of 
our European sample across time and firm size, we repeat our portfolio level analysis between 
two different sub-periods as well as between small and large firms. The corresponding results 
are presented in Table 3.3; for reasons of simplicity we only display the High-Low portfolio 
returns. 
Row (1) and (2) report sub-period results. The earlier sub-period runs from July 1990 to June 
2004 (168 months), while the later sub-period is from July 2004 to June 2018 (168 months). 
The return premium of firms with high CO measures was present in the earlier subsample 
and is even stronger in the more recent sub-period.  Interestingly, while in the earlier 
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subsample the reversal was also present for the second and third year after portfolio 
formation, the  subsample from 2004 to 2018 also displays a slightly significant positive 
return relation for longer holding periods, monthly 0.32 percent (t-statistic 3.28) for the 
second year and still 0.23 percent (t-statistic 2.46) in the third year.  
A further cause for concern for anomalous return patterns is their pervasiveness across size. 
To address this question, rows (3) and (4) present size-segmented subsample results. The 
small (large) subsample consists of the bottom (top) 50% of firms in each county in terms of 
market equity, measured as of June of each year. As is the case for most other anomalies, the 
observed return effect is stronger among smaller firms, but it is not limited to them and is 
also significantly present among the largest and economically most important firms in 
European equity markets. We do not find that any of the sub-samples has a significant 
reversal for longer holding periods. 
To conclude this chapter, we finally test whether the abnormal returns are just a compensation 
of risk. Table 3.4 shows estimates based on the CAPM, the three-factor model and the Carhart 
four-factor model regressions over the full sample period.6 Panel A of Table 3.4 shows the 
CAPM results; we find economically substantial and statistically significant alpha estimates 
in our European sample. Once again, the return premium among firms with high CO is 
measurable during the first year after portfolio formation, but no reversal appears in the long 
term.  
Controlling additionally for firm size and value/growth characteristics, Panel B of Table 3.4 
shows results for the three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993). Interestingly, the alpha 
increases slightly for all holding periods compared to the CAPM alphas. From the negative 
loadings on the SMB and HML factors, we learn that the High-Low portfolio is nested within 
large stocks with growth characteristics.  
 
 
6  For simplicity we only show the high-low portfolio results. 
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Table 3.4  Time series regressions 
Panel A: CAPM 
High - Low 1 Month 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
Alpha 1.35 0.77 0.02 -0.10 
 (9.27) (6.23) (0.23) (-1.00) 
Beta -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.03 
 (-2.56) (-1.52) (-0.11) (1.04) 
 
Panel B: Carhart 4 Factor 
High - Low 1 Month 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
Alpha 1.13 0.64 0.08 0.01 
 (10.59) (7.23) (0.89) (0.08) 
Beta -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-1.70) (-1.14) (-1.14) (-1.02) 
SMB 0.00 -0.11 -0.18 -0.21 
 (0.02) (-3.28) (-5.43) (-5.90) 
HML -0.12 -0.16 -0.26 -0.15 
 (-1.44) (-3.40) (-6.37) (-4.11) 
WML 0.32 0.22 0.04 -0.07 
 (12.62) (11.42) (1.32) (-3.87) 
 
This table presents results from time-series regressions to explain the return premiums on the High - 
Low CO strategy. High - Low buys firms with a CO measure within the top 20% of all firms and sells 
firms with a CO measure in the bottom 20%. The table shows the average monthly (first column) and 
yearly premiums in percent, the alpha estimates, and the factor sensitives depending on the CAPM 
(Panel A) and the Carhart four-factor model (Panel B). The t-statistic is given in parentheses.  
 
Panel B of Table 3.4 shows results for the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) where we 
additionally add the momentum factor to the time-series regression. As a result of the high 
correlation between the CO measure and the momentum factor the alphas in the four-factor 
model diminish within the first year.7 However, we still find statistically and economically 
significant returns in up to twelve months holding periods. While in the U.S. the four-factor 
alphas shrink down to about a half compared to the three-factor ones, in our European sample 
 
7  We have also redone the calculations with the three-factor model. As results stay very similar for clarity we 
only present results for the CAPM and the four-factor model here. 
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the alpha reduces only 24 bps from 0.88 percent per month to 0.64 percent with a strong t-
statistic of 7.23. 
All in all, the results in this section strongly support Hypothesis 1. Similar to the remarkable 
findings of Byun et al. (2016) on the U.S. stock market, we observe a powerful positive 
relation between the CO measure and subsequent stock returns on the European stock market 
as well. 
3.4 Return Effects of High and Low CO Measures with Controls 
Portfolio sorts represent a very useful approach for investigating how average returns vary 
with different levels of CO measures. However, the portfolio-level analysis suffers from the 
lack of lost individual stock information through aggregation. Furthermore, showing that a 
positive return premium exists does not rule out the possibility that the identified return effect 
is just a manifestation of already known determinants of the cross-section of average stock 
returns.  
To test Hypothesis 2, we therefore examine the return effects at the individual firm level 
using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology, in this section. They provide a test setting 
that easily allows for multiple control variables. To address this issue, we estimate a monthly 
firm level cross-sectional regression of the firm’s future return on common firm 
characteristics that all predate the dependent variable.  
In particular, the future return of firm i in month t is regressed on two binary indicator 
variables, denoted High and Low, in conjunction with common controls that are all available 
before the month in which the return measurement begins: 
 
ri,t = a0,t + a1,tHighi,t + a2,tLowi,t + a3,tln(SZi,t) + a4,tBMi,t + a5,tOPi,t + a6,tINVi,t +  
Country Dummiesi,t + ei,t. 
(3) 
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To correct for the holding period overlap in the statistical inference (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993) we apply Newey and West (1987) adjusted t statistics in all subsequent regressions. 
The high (low) CO indicator is equal to one if the firm’s continuing overreaction measure is 
in the top (bottom) 20 percent of all CO measures, and zero otherwise. Taking into account 
the most recent developments in asset pricing, the set of common firm characteristics 
includes firm size, book-to-market, momentum, operating profitability, and investment, that 
all serve as common control variables in the later cross-sectional return analyses (Fama and 
French, 2015). All explanatory variables are updated each June, except for momentum, which 
is updated monthly. Furthermore, to control for possible country effects, we include country 
dummies in all our regressions. Thus, the average coefficient estimate measures the within-
country effects, that is, the variables’ return-predictive ability in a typical country of the 
sample.  
Table 3.5 shows average coefficient estimates from the outlined firm-level cross-sectional 
regressions of overlapping yearly returns without controls to assess the high-low return 
behavior. The last row of each panel reports the difference between firms with high and low 
measures of continuing overreaction. 
Table 3.5  Cross-sectional regressions  
Panel A: Without Controls 
 1 Month 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
High CO 0.67 4.97 -0.34 -1.18 
 (6.51) (4.39) (-0.37) (-1.37) 
Low CO -0.53 -4.4 -0.25 -0.12 
 (-6.62) (-5.59) (-0.31) (-0.18) 
     
R² 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
     
High-Low 1.21 9.37 -0.09 -1.06 
 (7.80) (5.83) (-0.06) (-0.74) 
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Panel B: With Common Controls 
 1 Month 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
     
High CO 0.15 2.6 0.57 -0.38 
 (2.67) (3.97) (0.99) (-0.96) 
Low CO -0.17 -2.59 -0.66 -0.34 
 (-2.69) (-4.67) (-1.12) (-0.66) 
SZ 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.16 
 (2.09) (0.04) (0.40) (0.40) 
BM 0.28 3.41 3.35 2.89 
 (2.83) (1.97) (1.93) (1.91) 
OP 0.1 1.68 1.69 1.6 
 (3.90) (4.14) (3.88) (4.02) 
INV -0.38 -3.07 -2.77 -1.85 
 (-5.50) (-2.41) (-2.56) (-2.03) 
MOM 1.15 5.18 -2.48 -1.45 
 (3.50) (1.68) (-1.01) (-0.65) 
     
R² 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
     
High-Low 0.33 5.19 1.23 -0.04 
 (3.06) (5.39) (1.42) (-0.06) 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s future one month, first-year, second-year or third-year return after the CO calculation. High 
(Low) CO is a binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s CO measure is in the 
top (bottom) 20% of all firms and zero otherwise. The independent variables are firm size (SZ), book-
to-market (BM), operating profitability (OP), investment (INV), and momentum (MOM). All 
regressions include country dummies. In the regressions, SZ and BM are measured in natural logs. 
R² is adjusted for degrees of freedom. The last row provides the average return premium in percent 
based on the difference between the high and low coefficient estimates. Panel A reports results for 
the high and low coefficient estimates without controls. Panel B contains additional results for the 
full set of independent controls. 
 
As expected, we find an economically strong and statistically significant premium in the first 
year of 9.37, which is equally driven by the high CO indicator (4.97%) and a negative low 
CO indicator (-4.40%). The high-low premium is only significant in the first year after 
portfolio formation and becomes insignificant thereafter. 
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Panel B of Table 3.5 includes the common controls as a further robustness test. The premium 
shrinks less than 1 percent to 8.52% for a one year holding period after portfolio formation 
and is still strongly significant (t-statistic 5.49). While size and book-to-market are 
insignificant, operating profitability loads positive and the investment factor significantly 
negative on the return premium.   
To finally conclude whether momentum drives out the return premium of the continuing 
overreaction measure we include a momentum factor to the regression in Panel B of Table 
3.5. While the momentum factor leads towards significance in the first year (t-statistic 1.68), 
it turns negative in the second year. The CO premium stays significant positive at 5.19 for 
the first year and still becomes insignificant thereafter. 
In summary, the results in this section strongly support our Hypothesis 2. Similar to the 
results of prior U.S. studies, we observe an economically strong and statistically significant 
CO premium, that could not be explained by established cross-sectional determinates. 
Interestingly, even if we add a momentum factor, the CO premium stays significant.  
3.5 CO measures within different business conditions 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 3 that the return premium between firms with high 
measures of CO and firms with low CO is also present within different business conditions. 
It is well established that momentum profits vary within different business conditions. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) were among the first to show that momentum performs well 
during expanding periods while the momentum premium is smaller within recessive periods, 
based on the NBER recession indicator. Further studies expand these findings with various 
measures of optimistic/expanding economy states versus contracting/pessimistic economy 
states (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2011). Hereinafter we examine whether the novel continuing 
overreaction measure conforms to the same return pattern as with a standard momentum 
approach. To address this question, we estimate monthly firm-level cross-sectional 
regressions based on Equation (3) for two different specifications, i.e., negative versus 
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positive specifications that depend on the underlying state of the economy. We use six 
different proxies to measure the positive/negative economic states. Namely: market 
volatility, market states, investor sentiment, market liquidity, default spread, and the NBER 
recession indicator. While market volatility as well as market states are based on European 
data, due to missing cross-country proxies, the remaining four measures are based on U.S. 
data. Baker, Wurgler and Yuan (2012) demonstrate that sentiment around the globe is 
predominantly driven by the U.S. sentiment and that this can therefore serve as a proxy for 
European sentiment as well. Moreover, the USA as the world’s largest and most important 
equity market take up a leading role for international markets as documented by Rapach et 
al. (2013).  
The six different proxies to measure the state of the economy are defined in the following 
way. Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), market volatility is the annual standard deviation 
of the value-weighted European market portfolio returns over the prior 12 months, skipping 
the most recent month. Market state is calculated using the cumulative return on the value-
weighted European market portfolio over the 36 months ahead of the calculation point of the 
continuing overreaction measure (Cooper et al., 2004). We use the well-known Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, that uses monthly U.S. data, to capture investor sentiment. 
Market liquidity is measured using the noise index of Hu et al. (2013) that uses the aggregate 
noise in the prices of U.S. Treasury bonds, thus the deviation between market and model-
implied yields. We use the level of noise in the U.S. Treasury bond market as a proxy for 
market-wide liquidity due to the fact that this market is one of the most active and liquid 
markets in the world and one with the highest credit quality. Default spread is the monthly 
difference between a 10-year U.S. corporate bond index and 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds, as 
applied by Fama and French (1993). To separate crisis from non-crisis periods over the 
sample period, we use the NBER recession indicator for the USA. We calculate the median 
of market volatility, investor sentiment, market liquidity and default spread to separate 
between optimistic and pessimistic values for those measures, while positive (negative) 36-
month returns of the market indicate up (down) market states. 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the average return premiums related with continuing overreaction and 
a standard momentum approach; the last bars provide the difference between the CO and the 
momentum measure. The black bars illustrate pessimistic (contracting) business conditions 
while the clear bars display the optimistic (expanding) business conditions, as calculated by 
the six proxies for the state of the economy (Panel A to F). The premiums are the results from 
the differences between the high and low (long and short) coefficient estimates from the 
outlined firm-level cross-sectional regression setting. As before, we include common 
controls and country dummies in every single regression.  
Notwithstanding the economic state proxy, both approaches gain significantly positive return 
premiums during optimistic periods. Across all proxies, the average CO profit amounts to 
9.40% per year while a standard momentum approach gains 11.44% per year, as a 
consequence, the difference between the CO and momentum approach during positive 
business conditions is negative (-2.04% per annum). The strong momentum premium during 
positive periods, as already documented by previous literature, leads to the observed return 
pattern and the superiority of the momentum strategy here. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) 
find a significant positive return premium only during expanding periods, as well as Antoniou 
et al. (2013) who show that momentum profits are high during up markets and insignificant 
low in down markets, following the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006) for sentiment 
calculations.  
As a natural consequence, regardless of the applied economic state proxy, the average return 
premium during negative periods is significantly stronger among the novel continuing 
overreaction measure. The average CO premium amounts to 6.78% per annum while the 
momentum premium gains only 3.58%, which leads to a positive difference between the two 
approaches of 3.20% per annum. Especially worth mentioning is the superiority of the CO 
measure regarding the proxies for crisis/non-crisis (NBER recession indicator) and up/down 
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Figure 3.1  Premiums conditional upon business conditions 
Panel A: Market volatility 
 
Panel B: Market states 
 
Panel C: Investor sentiment 
 
Panel D: Market liquidity 
 
Panel E: Default spread 
 
Panel F: NBER recession indicator 
 
This figure illustrates the average return premiums associated with the continuing overreaction 
measure (CO), a standard momentum strategy (MOM) and the difference of both strategies (CO – 
MOM) in percent per year during contracting/pessimistic business conditions (black bars) and 
expanding/optimistic business conditions (clear bars), as measured by six different economic state 
proxies (Panels A to F). 
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markets. During pessimistic periods the momentum premium is near zero (crisis) or even 
strongly negative (down markets), while the CO measure gains significantly positive return 
premiums irrespective of the applied economic state.  
In summary, on the one hand, these empirical results corroborate the findings by prior 
literature that the momentum premium is particularly strong during expanding/optimistic 
periods and very weak during contracting/pessimistic periods. On the other hand, these 
results clearly point out the superiority of the CO measure over a one year holding period in 
comparison to a standard momentum approach, displayed in the continuity especially during 
contracting/pessimistic periods.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the U.S. findings of Byun et al. (2016) that a continuing overreaction 
measure can predict future stock returns in the broad cross-section of European firms drawn 
from 15 developed equity markets over the sample period from 1990 to 2018. The measure 
is calculated by taking the weighted signed volume as well as past returns into account. We 
provide strongly supportive out-of-sample evidence on the previous findings on the U.S. 
stock market. 
As in the United States we find a significantly positive relation between firms’ continuing 
overreaction measure and the subsequent stock return. The outperformance of firms with 
high measures of continuing overreaction over low CO measures is not captured by 
established cross-sectional return determinants. The observed premium is robust to common 
controls based on firm size, book-to-market and momentum as well as to novel controls like 
profitability and investment. In addition, the premium is also present within different 
business conditions, we use market volatility, market states, investor sentiment, market 
liquidity, default spread, and the NBER recession indicator. In depth, the novel CO measure 
earns a significantly positive return premium over a holding period of one year that does not 
suffer from reversal as a standard momentum approach does in the subsequent years. 
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Companies with high CO measures gain abnormal returns over an observed holding period 
of up to three years.  
Given the similarity between our European findings and the prior U.S. evidence, it is unlikely 
that the superior predictive power of CO measure is sample-specific. Indeed, our results 
suggest that the continuing overreaction measure is a superior applicable measure even in 
Europe. 
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Overnight Returns: An International Sentiment Measure 
This research project is joint work with Ulrich Wessels. The paper has been published as: 
Florian Weißofner and Ulrich Wessels (2019), Overnight Returns: An International 
Sentiment Measure, Journal of Behavioral Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Abstract The suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific investor sentiment measure, 
previously found in the US, is similarly present in international equity markets. This delivers 
a completely novel approach to measure investor sentiment at the firm level. For applicability 
reasons overnight returns have to fulfill three characteristics that would be expected of a 
sentiment measure. First, overnight returns persist in the short-run, second, this persistence 
is stronger among harder-to-value firms, and third, stocks with high overnight returns 
underperform in the long-run. Implementing this novel sentiment measure on a common 
anomaly, we find explanatory power even beyond a market-wide sentiment measure. 
 
Keywords Investor sentiment; Overnight returns; International markets; Asset pricing; 
Behavioral finance  
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4.1 Introduction 
It is well established that sentiment plays a substantial role in stock markets all around the 
globe. A broad set of literature focuses on this topic and mainly concentrate on market-wide 
investor sentiment (Brown and Cliff, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 
2012). However, international sentiment literature is scarce and no established sentiment 
measure for international stock markets is available so far (Baker et al., 2012). In a recent 
study on the U.S. stock market, Aboody et al. (2018) find strong evidence that overnight 
returns function as a measure of firm-specific investor sentiment. In particular, they 
document that overnight returns possess characteristics that would be expected for a 
sentiment measure at the firm level and present affirmative results for the price reaction to 
earnings announcements.  
In their early theoretical work, Shleifer and Summers (1990) postulate that the trading 
behavior of retail investors, typically characterized as uninformed traders, is mostly affected 
by sentiment which makes them trade at prices not justified by news or fundamentals. 
Typically, sentiment-driven retail investors tend to act as a herd – trading the same stocks at 
the same time in the same direction – which causes price pressure and risk that may deter 
institutional investors from trading against them as they are likely to be risk averse. As a 
result, the price impact of retail investors trading is quite substantial and can cause stock 
prices to deviate from their underlying fundamental values.1 Using a unique dataset of retail 
investor’s trades at a major U.S. discount broker, Kumar and Lee (2006) confirm these 
predictions. Specifically, they show that retail investor’s sentiment has significant impact on 
stock prices as individual investors trading behavior is systematically correlated.2 The 
observed effects of sentiment-driven retail trading are particularly pronounced for stocks that 
 
1  For further theoretical work, see De Long et al. (1990, 1991), Lee et al. (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
or Barberis et al. (2005). 
2  There are earlier studies which examine the correlated trading behavior of individual investors without 
linking the results to expected stock returns. For example, Jackson (2003) observes systematic trading 
patterns among retail investors in Australia. Using a Chinese data set, Feng and Seasholes (2004) document 
a strong correlation among the trading activities of investors that live within a certain geographic region.  
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are more difficult to value and are more costly to arbitrage – two factors that hinder arbitrage 
trading activities by institutional investors.3 
Based on the premise that retail investors face the problem that they must select from 
thousands of stocks when they want to buy (see Odean, 1999), Barber and Odean (2008) 
provide evidence that individual investors limit this search problem by focusing on stocks 
that recently attracted their attention. In particular, the researchers show that individual 
investors are net buyers on the subsequent trading day following attention-triggering events. 
Motivated by these observations, Berkman et al. (2012) demonstrate that the herding 
behavior following high-attention days creates price pressure especially at the open of the 
next trading day. This is due to the fact, that retail investors tend to place their orders 
overnight, whereas institutional investors concentrate their trading activities on the opening 
hours of stock exchanges because of lower trading costs and a reduced risk trading against 
the irrational herd of individual investors.4 Bolstered by earlier theoretical and empirical 
evidence that retail investors are most affected by sentiment, Berkman et al. (2012) conclude 
that overnight returns can serve as a measure for firm-specific sentiment. 
The findings of Aboody et al. (2018) that overnight returns function as a measure of 
sentiment are interesting especially for international stock markets for three reasons. First, 
overall there is no ubiquitous sentiment measure available at the firm level, where most of 
the literature focuses on market-wide sentiment.5 In their seminal work, Aboody et al. (2018) 
provide evidence that overnight returns proxy for firm-specific investor sentiment on the U.S. 
equity market. Second, literature that focuses on international stock markets has to use U.S. 
sentiment measures as proxies for international sentiment (Walkshäusl, 2016).6 This is due 
 
3  For further evidence on the price impact of retail investors herding behavior see Hvidkjaer (2008), Kaniel et 
al. (2008), Barber et al. (2009b) or Berkman et al. (2012). 
4  The recent evidence of Lou et al. (2018) confirms these observations. 
5  See, e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006), Arif and Lee (2014), Gao and Süss (2015), Huang et al. (2015), and 
Stambaugh et al. (2012). 
6  Eun and Lee (2010) argue that markets around the globe have become more integrated and Rapach et al. 
(2013) show that the USA plays a leading role for international markets. 
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to the lack of a universally valid sentiment measure for international markets and based on 
the findings of Baker et al. (2012) that international investor sentiment is transferable and 
partially driven by US sentiment.7 Third, compared to the well-known and most applied 
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2006), the method proposed by Aboody et al. 
(2018) does not require special datatypes. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2006) use the 
exclusive datasets for IPOs from Jay Ritter’s website, which delivers data primarily for the 
U.S. market. 
A measure to directly gauge investor sentiment on the individual firm-level would have a 
wide range of potential applications not just in terms of academic research but also for 
practioners. However, and in the sense of Lo and MacKinlay (1990), any finding in empirical 
research could be the result of data snooping and therefore be sample-specific. In 
consequence, it is questionable whether overnight returns really function as a proxy for 
investor sentiment out-of-sample. Since international stock markets provide an ideal test-
setting to challenge the results of Aboody et al. (2018), we examine the suitability of 
overnight returns as a measure of firm-specific sentiment in the broad cross-section of 
international, non-American firms. Observing similar results to the recent U.S. evidence in 
Aboody et al. (2018) would strengthen their findings and the importance of overnight returns 
in a behavioral context. That may ultimately lead to a better understanding of overnight 
returns around the globe and extends the application scope for a firm-specific sentiment 
measure to international equity markets. 
In addition to the extensive out-of-sample evidence, we contribute to the literature by 
analyzing the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific investor sentiment measure 
in a cross-sectional test setting which has two advantages compared to the time-series test 
setting applied by Aboody et al. (2018). First, we can directly examine the effect of overnight 
returns at the firm-level leaving out possible portfolio effects, which could bias the results. 
 
7  As a direct measure is not available so far, Schmeling (2009) use consumer confidence as a proxy for the 
investor sentiment on international markets. 
Chapter 4   Overnight Returns: An International Sentiment Measure 
 
 
61 
Second, conventional time-series test settings to calculate abnormal returns are based on 
close-to-close returns, whereas we examine overnight returns. However, a cross-sectional 
test setting allows us to easily control for various return determinants typically used in asset 
pricing literature as the respective characteristics can directly be used as explanatory 
variables. Finding evidence would be a substantial contribution for international sentiment 
literature, as overnight returns could be used as a direct sentiment measure on any examined 
equity market. Therefore, sentiment for international markets could be determined at the 
firm-level and no proxies would be necessary. 
Specifically, derived from Aboody et al. (2018) we test the following three hypotheses out-
of-sample in international stock markets. Finding supporting evidence for all of the three 
hypotheses is necessary to confirm the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific 
sentiment measure. 
The first hypothesis addresses the short-run persistence of overnight returns. According to 
Barber et al. (2009a), the investment behavior of retail investors is strongly affected by 
sentiment. They conclude that a disparity in orders of retail investors remains persistent over 
subsequent weeks. Taking into account that Berkman et al. (2012) show that retail investors 
tend to place orders outside the opening hours of stock exchanges, overnight returns should 
remain similarly persistent over several weeks. 
Hypothesis 1:  Firms with high overnight returns yield significantly positive risk-adjusted 
returns in the short-run. 
Our second hypothesis is motivated by the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006). They show 
that market-wide sentiment has a greater impact on firms that are objectively harder-to-value. 
Further literature also shows that sentiment affects the returns of firms that are harder to value 
more, than firms that are easier to value. 8 
 
8  See e.g., Berkman et al. (2009), Hirbar and McInnis (2012), and Seybert and Yang (2012). 
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Specifically, in line with Aboody et al. (2018) we test the short run persistence for five harder-
to-value measures, namely size, book-to-market ratio, operating profitability, volatility and 
age. For the validity of the assumption, the overnight return persistence should be stronger 
among firms that are objectively harder-to-value. 
Hypothesis 2: The short-run overnight return persistence is significantly higher for harder-
to-value firms. 
The third hypothesis addresses the long-term underperformance of stocks with high demand 
from retail investors in the short-run. This assumption is based on the findings of Hvidkjaer 
(2008) and Barber et al. (2009a), who show that stocks with high short-term demand from 
retail investors underperform those stocks with relatively low short-term demand. This 
temporary mispricing is a characteristic what is expected of a sentiment measure. Even Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) argue that stocks with more attention from optimistic traders earn lower 
returns over the subsequent 12 months. Therefore, the returns in the long-run should be 
smaller among the firms with high overnight returns. 
Hypothesis 3: Stocks with high overnight returns yields significantly smaller risk-adjusted 
returns in the long-run. 
Our results are easily summarized. Similar to the United States, overnight returns are suitable 
as an international measure for firm-specific investor sentiment. First, we find a significant 
and positive overnight return persistence for about four weeks or longer after portfolio 
formation that cannot be explained by established return predictors of the cross-section. 
Second, the overnight return persistence is considerable larger among firms that are harder 
to value, even though we control for common risk factors. Thus, the effect is stronger for 
firms that are smaller, have a high book-to-market ratio, a low profitability, a high volatility 
or have a younger age. Third, stocks with high overnight returns in the short run obtain 
negative total returns in the long run and vice versa.  
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Taken together, our out-of-sample analysis strongly supports the findings in Aboody et al. 
(2018). Hence, the overnight return effect and consequently its applicability as a firm-specific 
sentiment measure seems to be a phenomenon across stock markets.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables 
used in this study. Section 3 examines the short-run persistence of overnight returns. Section 
4 investigates whether the observed return behavior is stronger among harder-to-value firms. 
Section 5 studies the long-term behavior of stocks with strong overnight returns in the short 
run. Section 6 presents application results and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
4.2 Data and Variables 
We study an international country sample that consists of firms from 20 developed non-U.S. 
equity markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The sample selection mirrors the countries 
included in the famous Europe, Australia and the Far East (EAFE) stock market benchmark 
form MSCI that measures stock market performance outside of North America. We collect 
daily closing and opening prices on common stocks from Datastream and firm-level 
accounting information (e.g., book equity) from Worldscope. We calculate the daily close-
to-close (total) return, 𝑟EFGHI<(G<EFGHI,(' , using standard total return prices. The intraday return, 𝑟'J(KLMLN,(' , is the return between the opening and closing of the same day t. Given that 
Datastream provides total return prices only for the close, we calculate intraday returns with 
adjusted opening and closing prices in line with the methodology proposed by Lou et al. 
(2018). Therefore, we assume that dividend adjustments that could move share prices occur 
overnight.9 The overnight return is then calculated as the deviation between close-to-close 
and intraday return. 
 
 
9  Results are similar when we use local currencies. 
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𝑟'J(KLMLN,(' = 𝑃	('𝑃𝑂(' − 1, (1) 
 
where 𝑃	('  is the closing price for the shares of firm i on day t, and 𝑃𝑂(' is the opening price 
for the shares on day t. 
 
𝑟EFGHI<(G<EFGHI,(' = 𝑅𝐼	('𝑅𝐼	(<?' − 1, (2) 
 
where 𝑅𝐼	('  is the total return closing price for the shares of firm i on day t, and 𝑅𝐼	(<?'  is the 
total return closing price for the shares on day t - 1. 
 
𝑟GTIKJ'UV(,(' = 1 + 𝑟EFGHI<(G<EFGHI,('1 + 𝑟'J(KLMLN,(' − 1 (3) 
 
Following Lou et al. (2018), we then calculate the weekly overnight returns, taking the 
compounded daily overnight return starting on Wednesday of week w - 1 and ending on 
Tuesday of week w.10 The weekly close-to-close return is calculated by the same method. 
To ensure that accounting information is known before the returns are calculated, we match 
the latest accounting information for the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year with 
stock returns from the first week in July (~ week 27) of the current year to the end of June (~ 
week 26) of the subsequent year throughout the paper. All data are denominated in U.S. 
dollars.11 To ensure that our results are not driven by tiny or illiquid stocks, we follow Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) and exclude very small firms by eliminating the 5 per cent 
 
10  Beginning on Wednesday is consistent with Lehmann (1990) and Barber et al. (2009a). 
11  We have also redone all calculations with local currencies and gain very similar results. 
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of firms with the lowest market equity in each country. Furthermore, as in Fama and French 
(1992) firm-year observations with negative book equity are excluded from the sample. Due 
to the fact that most of the countries have reported opening prices since 1992, our sample 
period starts in the first week of July in 1992 and ends in the last week of June 2017. 
Panel A of Table 4.1 reports a summary statistic for the countries included in the international 
sample. On average our sample includes 7918 firms, where the largest portion falls on the 
countries Japan and the United Kingdom.   
The variables used in this study are defined as follows. Beta (BETA) is estimated relative to 
all stocks using 5 years (60 months) of past returns. A firm’s size (SZ) is its stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, calculated as of the end of every month in 
million U.S. dollars. Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of book equity to market equity at the 
fiscal year-end. Momentum (MOM) is the cumulative prior six-month stock return, skipping 
the most recent month (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Following Fama and French (2015), 
investment (INV) is the annual change in total assets divided by lagged total assets. Operating 
profitability (OP) is revenues minus cost of goods sold and interest expense, all divided by 
book equity. Age (AGE) is the number of years since a company was founded. In line with 
Aboody et al. (2018) volatility (VOL) is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns for the prior twelve-month stock return, skipping the most recent month. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Countries 
Country Firms Country Firms 
 
Australia 
 
720 
 
Japan 
 
2804 
Austria 38 Netherlands 121 
Belgium 86 New Zealand 72 
Denmark 93 Norway 129 
Finland 111 Portugal 38 
France 460 Singapore 307 
Germany 464 Spain 113 
Hong Kong 621 Sweden 254 
Ireland 23 Switzerland 176 
Italy 205 United Kingdom 1083 
 
Panel B: Variables 
Variable Mean 25th Median 75th 
 
BETA 
 
0.92 
 
0.51 
 
0.86 
 
1.26 
SZ 1273.32 55.03 171.81 670.42 
BM 0.98 0.43 0.75 1.24 
MOM 0.06 -0.14 0.02 0.20 
OP 0.72 0.23 0.50 0.90 
INV 0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.17 
AGE 38.61 15.96 33.99 58.61 
VOL 0.38 0.23 0.32 0.47 
 
This table shows summary statistics for the countries included in the international (EAFE) sample 
and the variables used in this study. Panel A reports the average number of firms in each country over 
the sample period from July 1992 to June 2017. For the most part of the sample data is available since 
1992 namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom. For the rest of the sample data history for 
opening prices starts later, specifically Finland (2001/03), Hong Kong (1994/06), Ireland (1999/01), 
New Zealand (1996/02), Norway (1995/12), and Sweden (2001/06). Panel B reports the mean, 25th 
percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the variables. Beta (BETA) is estimated relative to all stocks 
using 60 months of past returns. Size (SZ) is market equity (stock price multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding) at the end of the previous month. Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of book equity 
to market equity for the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year. Momentum (MOM) is the 
cumulative prior six-month stock return, skipping the most recent month. Operating profitability (OP) 
is revenues minus cost of goods sold and interest expense, all divided by book equity. Investment 
(INV) is the annual change in total assets divided by total assets. Age (AGE) is the number of years 
since the firms’ foundation (calculated as of the end of each month). Volatility (VOL) is the standard 
deviation of prior twelve-month stock return, skipping the most recent month.  
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Panel B of Table 4.1 presents a summary statistic for variables used in this study. Focusing 
on the key variables of interest that moreover serve as our hard-to-value measures, we 
observe that a typical firm in our sample has an average size of $ 1.273 million, an average 
book-to-market ratio of 0.98 and a mean operating profitability of 0.72. The age of firms 
exhibits a mean (median) of 38.61 (33.99) years and the mean (median) volatility is 38% 
(32%) among the whole sample. 
4.3 Short-Term Persistence in Overnight Returns 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 1 that firms with high overnight returns yield significantly 
positive overnight returns in the short run. We first present the baseline results for our 
international sample and further examine the robustness of our main findings with respect to 
common control variables and different subsamples. 
Baseline results 
To obtain a first impression of the persistence of overnight returns, we begin our analysis at 
the portfolio level. In particular, each Wednesday, we form quintile portfolios by sorting 
stocks based on their overnight return of week w. We then calculate the subsequent average 
weekly overnight returns for the following weeks w + 1 up to week w + 4.  
Table 4.2 presents average weekly returns for quintile portfolios sorted on overnight returns. 
Panel A of Table 4.2 shows associated overnight returns for subsequent weeks. While the 
lowest quintile displays -0.91% for week w + 1 the quintile with the highest past overnight 
returns displays 0.95% in week w + 1. Accordingly, this yields a highly significant positive 
return of 1.86% for the high minus low portfolio in week w + 1. The long-short return 
decreases slightly during the following weeks; however it is still strong and significant in 
week w + 4 (1.41%).  Thus, we note that a long-short strategy based on past overnight returns 
produces significant return differences over the following weeks. These findings are in line 
with the U.S. findings by Aboody et al. (2018).  
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Table 4.2  Persistence of Weekly Overnight Returns and Related Weekly Close-to-Close Returns 
Panel A: Persistence of Overnight Returns 
 Average weekly overnight return 
Quintiles     
OVN Returns Week w + 1 Week w + 2 Week w + 3 Week w + 4 
     
1 -0.91 -0.79 -0.73 -0.69 
2 -0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 
3 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 
4 0.42 0.37 0.36 0.36 
5 0.95 0.79 0.73 0.72 
     
(5) – (1) 1.86 1.58 1.46 1.41 
 (37.90) (40.26) (33.29) (35.23) 
 
Panel B: Behavior of Related Close-to-Close Returns 
 Average weekly close-to-close return 
Quintiles     
OVN Returns Week w + 1 Week w + 2 Week w + 3 Week w + 4 
     
1 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.15 
2 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.19 
3 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 
4 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 
5 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 
     
(5) – (1) -0.14 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
 (-4.19) (-0.37) (0.93) (1.24) 
 
This table presents average weekly overnight and close-to-close returns for week w + 1 through w + 
4. The weekly overnight returns on the stock of firm i during week w is the accumulated daily 
overnight return beginning on Wednesday of week w – 1 and ending on Tuesday of week w. The 
weekly close-to-close return for week w is the compounded daily return over the period beginning on 
Wednesday of week w – 1 and ending on Tuesday of week w. We rank all stocks each week in 
ascending order according to their overnight return that week and partition the stocks into quintiles. 
Panel A reports the average weekly overnight return over the subsequent 4 weeks for the stocks in 
each quintile.  The last row provides the average spread return between firms with high and low 
overnight return. Panel B reports the average weekly close-to-close return.  The Newey-West adjusted 
t-statistic is given in parentheses. 
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For a comprehensive picture, we calculate the average weekly close-to-close (total) returns 
for the quintile portfolios for week w + 1 through week w + 4 (Panel B of Table 4.2). Unlike 
the overnight returns, the weekly total returns are not persistent throughout the weeks. Week 
w + 1 displays a slightly negative return premium for the long-short strategy (-0.14%), week 
w + 2 through week w + 4 yield no significant return results. Interestingly, the insignificant 
long-short portfolio returns seem to be the outcome of strong returns in the lowest portfolio, 
compared to Panel A of Table 4.2. To sum up, overnight returns have no predictive power 
for short term total returns. These findings are also in line with Aboody et al. (2018) who 
could not find steady total returns within the U.S. equity market either.  
Common risk factors and robustness 
Portfolio sorts represent a very useful approach to investigate how average returns vary with 
different levels of overnight returns. However, as it is of particular interest whether overnight 
returns can be used as a sentiment measure at the firm level, we now study the overnight 
return persistence at the individual firm level using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
methodology, which provides a test setting that easily allows for multiple control variables. 
In particular, we estimate a weekly cross-sectional regression of average weekly overnight 
returns in conjunction with common controls. Furthermore, we introduce a high (low) 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm’s overnight return of week w falls in the top 
(bottom) 20 per cent of all stocks and zero otherwise. Following Fama and French (2015), 
the set of common control variables includes beta (BETA), firm size (SZ), book-to-market 
(BM), operating profitability (OP), investment (INV) and momentum (MOM). The 
explanatory variables are either updated at the end of each June (BETA, SZ, BM, OP, INV) 
or weekly (MOM) to predict weekly overnight returns.  
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Panel A of Table 4.3 presents average coefficient estimates for weeks w + 1 to w + 4 within 
the outlined weekly firm-level cross-sectional regression to assess the persistence of the long-
short premium across time. The last row provides the economic and statistical significance 
of the average high-low returns reporting the difference between the high and low coefficient 
estimates.  
Table 4.3  Cross-Sectional Regressions of Weekly Overnight Returns on Overnight Return 
Indicators and Common Controls 
Panel A: Overnight Return Persistence throughout Subsequent Weeks 
 Week w + 1 Week w + 2 Week  w+ 3 Week w + 4 
     
High 0.73 0.58 0.50 0.52 
 (25.74) (23.20) (22.17) (24.15) 
Low -1.05 -0.90 -0.81 -0.78 
 (-26.65) (-27.00) (-23.92) (-25.05) 
BETA 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 (10.73) (11.95) (12.12) (11.67) 
SZ 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (3.06) (4.02) (4.29) (4.13) 
BM -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
 (-4.29) (-5.23) (-5.48) (-5.81) 
OP 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.12) (0.80) (0.75) (0.86) 
INV 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.78) (1.39) (1.15) (1.16) 
MOM -0.51 -0.28 -0.22 -0.16 
 (-5.51) (-4.14) (-3.63) (-2.86) 
     
R² 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
     
High-Low 1.77 1.47 1.32 1.30 
 (32.51) (34.63) (29.71) (33.82) 
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Panel B: Robustness of Overnight Return Persistence  
 Earlier Later Europe Asia Pacific Japan 
      
High 0.94 0.54 1.16 0.65 0.20 
 (26.08) (27.97) (12.52) (18.22) (15.68) 
Low -1.03 -1.06 -1.49 -1.44 -0.35 
 (-14.83) (-25.97) (-25.42) (-17.06) (-18.38) 
BETA -0.03 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.16 
 (-3.19) (6.24) (12.66) (8.57) (5.06) 
SZ -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.01 
 (-3.19) (10.06) (5.14) (5.21) (0.52) 
BM -0.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.32 0.02 
 (-0.10) (-9.44) (0.56) (-12.99) (1.48) 
OP 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 
 (5.53) (-4.38) (-0.22) (-0.95) (7.26) 
INV -0.06 0.09 0.02 0.12 -0.12 
 (-2.12) (7.12) (1.25) (6.02) (-3.46) 
MOM -0.94 -0.12 -0.50 -0.12 -1.16 
 (-8.90) (-1.06) (-6.17) (-0.95) (-9.00) 
      
R² 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 
      
High-Low 1.97 1.59 2.65  2.09  0.54 
 (21.15) (31.76) (19.71)  (23.67)  (23.08) 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from weekly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the firm’s 
future weekly overnight stock return. The overnight return indicator high (low) is equal to one if the 
firm’s weekly overnight return is in the top (bottom) 20 per cent during the formation week w, and 
zero otherwise. The independent variables are beta (BETA), firm size (SZ), book-to-market (BM), 
operating profitability (OP), investment (INV), and momentum (MOM). All regressions include 
country dummies. In the regressions, SZ and BM are measured in natural logs. R² is adjusted for 
degrees of freedom. The last row provides the average return premium in percent per week based on 
the difference between the high and low coefficient estimates. Panel A reports results for short-run 
persistence for week w + 1 through week w + 4. Panel B reports robustness results for week w + 1. 
The earlier and later half samples cover July 1992 to June 2004 and July 2004 to June 2017, 
respectively. Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Asia Pacific 
encompasses the remaining sample countries excluding Japan (see Table 4.1). 
 
Chapter 4   Overnight Returns: An International Sentiment Measure 
 
 
72 
Beginning with week w + 1, we find a significant positive coefficient estimate on the high 
indicator of 0.73 per cent per week while the low indicator is significantly negative at -1.05 
per cent. This leads to a highly significant and large high-low premium of 1.77 per cent per 
week (t-statistic 32.51) in the first week. Similar to Panel A of Table 4.2, the returns decline 
constantly throughout the subsequent weeks but are still strong (1.30%) in week 4. 
Given that we examine weekly overnight returns, our results deviate from effects observed 
in a standard cross-sectional regression setting. Panel A of table 4.3 shows overnight returns 
load positive on beta (0.19%) as well as on size (0.05%) in week w + 1 and stay almost 
unchanged throughout the weeks. The returns load significantly negative on book-to-market 
in every single week. Operating profitability appears to be slightly positive but us 
insignificant over the observed period. The estimated coefficient for investment is 
insignificant and close to zero for the observed period. Finally, the returns load significantly 
negative on momentum especially for week w + 1 (-0.51%) and halve in the subsequent 
weeks but the premium still stays significantly negative. The negative momentum premium 
seems to be a consequence of bid-ask spread and price pressure that appears in the very short 
term (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Taken together in the very short term overnight returns 
load positive on size and profitability while they load negative on book-to-market and 
momentum. 
The previous findings strongly support Hypothesis 1 that overnight returns are persistent in 
the short-run. Nevertheless, to ensure that our results are robust, Panel B of Table 4.3 presents 
average coefficient estimates for week w + 1 for different sub-samples to assess the 
pervasiveness of overnight returns across different sample periods and different regions.12 
To address how persistent the observed effect is over time we divide our sample into two 
sub-periods. The earlier sub-period is from the first week in July in 1992 to the last week in 
June in 2004, while the later sub-period is from the beginning of July in 2004 to end of June 
 
12  As the results for subsequent weeks stay almost unchanged, for clarity we only present results for week w + 
1 here. 
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in 2017. As shown in the last row of Panel B, the return premium of overnight returns is 
economically sustainable and statistically highly significant in both sub-periods. Whereas the 
premium is slightly stronger in the earlier (1.88%) period, it still yields 1.54% in the more 
recent half of the sample period.13  
The Europe subsample yields a tremendously positive premium of 2.65 per cent per month 
in the first week after portfolio formation. A significantly positive high indicator (1.16%) as 
well as a significantly negative low indicator (-1.49%) equally drive the premium. Following 
Fama and French (2012), we divide the Asia subsample in Japan and Asia Pacific (including 
Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Similar to the European sample the 
Asia Pacific sample performs quite well with a positive premium of 2.09 per cent for the first 
week.  As expected from momentum studies on the Japanese equity market, the premium for 
the Japan sub-sample is considerably weaker.14 This might be due to missing individualism 
as described by Chui et al. (2010). Another explanation might be that this is simply due to 
chance as argued by Fama and French (2012). Nevertheless, and in contrast to a standard 
momentum approach, overnight returns still amount to a significant and positive premium of 
0.54 per cent for the first week after portfolio formation for the Japan sub-sample. 
In sum, the results in this section strongly support Hypothesis 1. Similar to the prior U.S. 
evidence, we observe a significant persistence of overnight returns, that cannot be explained 
by established cross-sectional return determinants, and that is robust within different sub-
periods and regions. 
 
 
13  We have also redone the calculations for a sub-sample spanning from December 2007 till June 2009 based 
on the NBER recession indicator to examine how our results are affected by the global financial crisis. While 
the Low coefficient is more pronounced during this period, the premium is quite similar as among the full 
sample period.  
14  Asness et al. (2013) and Fama and French (2012) find no momentum premium in Japan following a standard 
momentum approach. 
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4.4 Higher Spread for HTV Firms 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) already concluded that sentiment has greater impacts on 
considerably harder-to-value firms.15 Therefore, we test whether the overnight return 
pervasiveness is even stronger for harder-to-value firms in our Hypothesis 2. Finding this 
would support that overnight returns can be used as an international measure for sentiment.  
Following Aboody et al. (2018), we use five harder-to-value characteristics, namely firm 
size, book-to-market, profitability, volatility, and age. 16 Consistent with previous literature, 
firms that are small, have a high book-to-market ratio (as a proxy for growth opportunities), 
are less profitable, have a high stock return volatility or are young are harder to value.17  
 
Table 4.4  Cross-Sectional Regressions of Weekly Overnight Returns and Hard-to-Value Proxies 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Weekly Overnight Returns and HTV Proxies without 
Controls 
 SIZE BM OP VOL AGE 
      
OVN 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
 (65.11) (38.19) (33.26) (43.80) (33.93) 
OVN x 
DHTV 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 
 (4.28) (3.83) (6.71) (4.97) (9.09) 
SZ 0.05     
 (5.32)     
BM  -0.07    
  (-9.76)    
OP   0.02   
   (6.48)   
VOL    0.21  
    (2.45)  
AGE     0.20 
     (7.11) 
      
R² 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 
 
15  Other references: Hribar and McInnis (2012) and Seybert and Yang (2012). 
16  We use book-to-market instead of earnings-to-price, as it is more common in literature as a measure of growth 
(e.g., Fama and French, 2012). 
17  For example Baker and Wurgler (2006), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) and Seybert and Yang (2012), 
also use at least one of these characteristics as a hard-to-value proxy. 
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Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Weekly Overnight Returns and HTV Proxies with Controls 
 SIZE   BM OP VOL AGE 
      
OVN 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 
 (61.43) (36.40) (30.82) (38.66) (31.22) 
OVN x 
DHTV 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 
 (4.22) (2.49) (7.35) (4.82) (10.08) 
BETA 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.16 
 (9.85) (9.80) (9.83) (10.31) (9.22) 
SZ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 
 (4.90) (4.20) (4.29) (6.43) (3.59) 
BM -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
 (-4.49) (-5.02) (-4.03) (-4.29) (-2.69) 
OP 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (1.28) (1.47) (1.76) (1.38) (3.54) 
INV 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (1.16) (1.05) (1.02) (1.08) (1.45) 
MOM -0.54 -0.55 -0.56 -0.58 -0.56 
 (-6.39) (-6.32) (-6.38) (-6.52) (-7.12) 
VOL    0.31  
    (4.86)  
AGE     0.16 
     (7.30) 
      
R² 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from weekly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the firm’s 
overnight return in week w + 1. See Table 4.3, for a description of the independent variables. OVN 
is the firm’s overnight return of week w. DHTV is a dummy variable based on the corresponding 
harder-to-value characteristic namely size, book-to-market, operating profitability, volatility and age. 
For size (SIZE), operating profitability (OP) and age (AGE) the dummy (DHTV) is one if the 
characteristic is above 75% and zero otherwise. For book-to-market (BM) and volatility (VOL) the 
dummy is one if the characteristic is below 25% and zero otherwise. In the regressions, SZ and BM 
are measured in natural logs. R² is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Panel A reports results for the 
previous overnight return (OVN), the interaction term (OVNxDHTV) and the specific harder-to-
value characteristic. Panel B contains additional results for the full set of independent controls (see 
Table 4.3). 
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To test how the overnight returns vary between firms with different levels of hard-to-value 
characteristics, we proceed as follows. We estimate cross-sectional regressions of weekly 
overnight returns for week w + 1 on the overnight return of week w without control variables 
(Panel A of Table 4.4) and with the full set of control variables as outlined in Table 4.3 (Panel 
B of Table 4.4). To study the relation between overnight returns and the harder-to-value 
characteristics, we take the above mentioned harder-to-value characteristics into account. 
Furthermore, we employ an interaction term between overnight returns (OVN) and a dummy 
variable (DHTV) that equals one if a firm is objectively harder-to-value and zero otherwise. 
The interaction terms capture the differential overnight return effects regarding the particular 
hard-to-value characteristic.  
For size the related dummy variable is one if a firm’s size (SZ) is in the bottom quartile and 
zero otherwise. Dummy variables for profitability (OP) and age (AGE) are constructed 
accordingly and become one if the characteristic is in the bottom quartile of profitability or 
age respectively, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable for book-to-market (BM) and 
volatility (VOL) equals one if the variable is in the top quartile and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term (OVNxDHTV) is then the overnight return (OVN) of week w multiplied 
with the determined harder-to-value dummy (DHTV). Thus, the average coefficient estimate 
on the interaction term provides the economic difference of the overnight returns between 
firms with high levels of harder-to-value characteristics and the residual firms. 
Based on the previous findings in the literature and the alignment of our dummy variables, 
we expect positive estimates on every single interaction term between overnight returns and 
the hard-to-value characteristic to confirm Hypothesis 2. Therefore, the overnight return 
persistence should be stronger among firms that are objectively harder-to-value. 
Table 4.4 presents average coefficient estimates from the outlined weekly cross-sectional 
regressions for each of our five hard-to-value measures. For brevity, we only report results 
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for week w + 1.18 We provide results that control only for the respective harder-to-value 
characteristic in Panel A of Table 4.4, and for robustness concerns, additionally control for 
the full set of common controls in Panel B of Table 4.4. All reported regressions include 
country dummies. Inferences are, however, very similar when country dummies are omitted.  
First, analyzing Panel A of Table 4.4, as indicated by significantly positive values on size, 
profitability, volatility and age, firms that load on these measures have higher future 
overnight returns. The coefficient estimate on book-to-market is negative, which implicates 
a negative return relation between the book-to-market ratio and future overnight returns. 
Nevertheless, controlling for the harder-to-value characteristics does not drive out the 
overnight return persistence in the cross-section of overnight returns. In fact, OVN remains 
an economically and statistically highly significant predictor for future overnight returns 
across all variables. 
The signs on the interaction terms are consistent with our above-mentioned predictions. 
Every single interaction term between OVN and the hard-to-value dummy variable is 
significantly positive. These findings suggest that the positive overnight return persistence is 
stronger among firms that are objectively harder-to-value. In detail, for size, the average 
OVN coefficient estimate is 0.13 and the interaction term carries a value of 0.04 (t-statistic 
= 4.28). Hence, the results imply that the OVN return persistence is larger and statistically 
significant among smaller firms with an estimate of 0.17 (formally, 0.13 + 0.04). For book-
to-market, the overnight coefficient estimate is 0.14 and the interaction term amounts to 0.02 
(t-statistic = 3.83). Therefore, the results conclude that firms with a higher book-to-market 
have a greater overnight return persistence. Firms with low profitability have a higher 
overnight return persistence manifested in a positive interaction term of 0.02 (t-statistic = 
6.71). The overnight returns persistence turns out to be stronger among more volatile firms 
with an estimate of 0.16 (formally, 0.14 + 0.02). Finally, the results for age display that the 
 
18  The results remain very similar throughout week w + 2 to week w + 4. 
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effect is stronger among younger firms, with an estimate of the interaction term of 0.06 (t-
statistic = 9.09).  
Panel B of Table 4.4 includes common controls as further robustness checks of the stronger 
overnight return persistence among harder-to-value firms in the cross-sectional regression, 
namely beta, size, book-to-market, profitability, investment, and momentum as well as the 
particular harder-to-value characteristic if not already included in the common controls (VOL 
& AGE). The interactions and dummy variables operate in the same way as in Panel A of 
Table 4.4. The results obtained correspond qualitatively to those presented in Panel A and 
thus lead to the same inferences. Even with several control variables the results for each of 
the harder-to-value characteristics remain economically and statistically significant; thus the 
overnight return persistence is stronger among firms that are harder to value. 
In summary, the results in this section strongly support Hypothesis 2. Similar to the results 
of   prior U.S. studies, the short-term overnight return persistence is stronger among firms 
that are harder to value, which provides further evidence that overnight returns are suitable 
as a firm-specific investor sentiment measure. 
4.5 Long-Term Reversal 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 3, that in the long-run stocks with high overnight returns 
significantly underperform those with low overnight returns. In other words, we shed light 
on the long-term return behavior of stocks with high and low overnight returns during the 
formation period. This reflects the third requirement for the usability of overnight returns as 
a measure of firm-specific sentiment. Aboody et al. (2018) document for the U.S. equity 
market that for the first year after portfolio formation based on the monthly overnight returns 
of December, the close-to-close return is significantly lower in the top decile than in the 
bottom decile. Therefore, we test in the following whether these findings also occur in our 
non-U.S. sample.  
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We estimate monthly cross-sectional regressions of overlapping yearly close-to-close returns 
without control variables (Panel A of Table 4.5) and with the full set of the previously 
employed control variables that are either updated at the end of each June (BETA, SZ, BM, 
OP, INV) or monthly (MOM). The additional high (low) indicator is equal to one if the firm’s 
overnight return of the past month is in the top (bottom) 20 per cent and zero otherwise. Our 
observation period starts in July 1992 and ends in June 2017. 
Panel A of Table 4.5 presents average coefficient estimates from the outlined monthly firm-
level cross-sectional regression of overlapping yearly returns without controls to assess the 
long-run close-to-close return behavior. The last row provides the economic and statistical 
significance of the average return premium by reporting the difference between the high and 
low coefficient estimates. We find a significant negative premium of -0.76 for the first year, 
which is driven by a negative high indicator (-0.50%) and a positive low indicator (0.26%). 
The high-low premium stays significantly negative up to three years after portfolio formation 
and becomes insignificant thereafter.  
Table 4.5  Cross-Sectional Regressions for Longer Holding Period Close-to-Close Returns 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Close-to-Close Returns without Controls 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
    
High -0.50 -0.09 -0.39 
 (-0.70) (-0.13) (-0.75) 
Low 0.26 1.78 1.34 
 (0.33) (2.30) (2.11) 
    
R² 0.09 0.09 0.09 
    
High-Low -0.76 -1.87 -1.73 
 (-2.26) (-3.64) (-3.53) 
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Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Close-to-Close Returns with Controls 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
    
High -0.98 -0.13 -0.25 
 (-2.31) (-0.29) (-0.71) 
Low -0.47 1.08 1.02 
 (-0.90) (1.80) (1.89) 
BETA -0.48 -0.55 0.56 
 (-0.71) (-0.87) (0.65) 
SZ -0.66 -0.18 -0.08 
 (-2.36) (-0.74) (-0.36) 
BM 3.12 1.96 1.59 
 (4.48) (3.59) (3.39) 
OP 1.58 1.28 1.24 
 (7.42) (5.77) (5.35) 
INV -2.11 -1.40 -1.27 
 (-2.34) (-1.85) (-1.48) 
MOM 4.16 -4.37 -1.27 
 (1.59) (-3.10) (-1.00) 
    
R² 0.11 0.10 0.10 
    
High-Low -0.51 -1.21 -1.27 
 -1.00 -2.07 -2.34 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s first-year, second-year or third-year return after the portfolio formation. High (low) indicator 
is equal to one if a firm’s past monthly overnight return is in the top (bottom) 20 per cent and zero 
otherwise. See Table 4.3 for a description of the independent variables. In the regressions, SZ and 
BM are measured in natural logs. R² is adjusted for degrees of freedom. The last row provides the 
average return premium. Panel A reports results for the high and low indicators without controls and 
Panel B reports results for the full set of independent controls (see Table 4.3). 
 
Panel B of Table 4.5 includes the common controls as further robustness tests. The premium 
is insignificant for year one but significantly negative for years two and three after formation. 
Interestingly, the return on the high indicator is significantly negative for year one and 
diminishes in the following years. 
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Table 4.5 provides insights into the long-run of close-to-close returns sorted on past overnight 
returns. In sum, the results support our Hypothesis 3 that stocks with high overnight returns 
yield significantly smaller risk-adjusted returns in the long-run. These results indicate a 
potential overpricing of firms with high overnight returns in the short-run compared to those 
with low overnight returns. Thus, our international results strongly confirm the findings of 
Aboody et al. (2018) and previous literature by Hvidkjaer (2008) or Barber et al. (2009a) in 
favor of temporary mispricing. 
4.6 Application Test 
In this section, we use the firm-specific investor sentiment measure to examine the 
explanatory power in the context of the momentum anomaly motivated by recent empirical 
evidence. Using the well-known sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), Antoniou et 
al. (2013) show that momentum is strongly affected by market-wide sentiment.19  This 
provides an ideal test-setting to not just examine whether overnight returns affect momentum 
in a similar way, but also to test the firm-specific sentiment character of overnight returns by 
analyzing the explanatory power beyond market-wide sentiment. Following Antoniou et al. 
(2013), we define momentum as the cumulative returns from month t - 7 to t - 2 and present 
results for holding periods of six months and 12 months as well as the period from month 13 
to 24 after formation.  
To study the relation between momentum and overnight returns, we employ a momentum 
control variable (MOM) and a dummy variable (HOVN) that is one if a firm’s overnight 
return is in the top quintile during the formation month, and zero otherwise. As prior studies 
have shown, we expect a positive momentum effect for up to twelve months within our 
international sample, that turns negative in year two (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). If the 
overnight returns are suitable as a firm-specific sentiment measure we expect a significantly 
negative interaction term between momentum and the high overnight return dummy. In order 
 
19  Stambaugh et al. (2012) also provide similar results. 
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to examine whether overnight returns have explanatory power beyond market-wide 
sentiment, we split our sample into two subsamples relating to the BW sentiment measure 
following Stambaugh et al. (2012). 20 They suggest a high-sentiment month is one when the 
value of the measure in the previous month is about the median and zero otherwise. Thus, 
we have a subsample of high sentiment including 140 months of the observations period and 
a second subsample including 140 months of low sentiment.21 
Table 4.6 presents average coefficient estimates from the outlined monthly cross-sectional 
regressions for our momentum measure. In Panel A of Table 4.6 we provide results that 
control only for momentum and for the full set of common controls in Panel B. 
Analyzing the full Period of Panel A in Table 4.6, we find a significant momentum for a six-
month (4.79%) holding period as well as for a twelve-month (5.43%) holding period that 
turns negative in year 2 (-4.84%).  For six- and for twelve-months our interaction 
(MOMxHOVN) is significantly negative (-2.08% for six-months and -3.17% for twelve-
months), these results show that our firm-specific international sentiment measure has 
explanatory power for the momentum anomaly. Specifically, stocks with a high past 
overnight return have a significantly negative impact on the momentum premium.  
Table 4.6  Cross-Sectional Regressions of Momentum Conditional on Sentiment 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Momentum without Controls 
 Full Low BW Sentiment High BW Sentiment 
 6 Mo Year 1 Year 2 6 Mo Year 1 Year 2 6 Mo Year 1 Year 2 
          
Momentum 4.79 5.43 -4.84 2.37 -0.31 -2.80 7.29 11.62 -6.79 
 (2.66) (2.02) (-2.80) (0.75) (-0.07) (-1.86) (4.53) (5.06) (-2.41) 
MOMxHOVN -2.06 -3.17 0.51 -2.59 -2.90 -0.87 -1.69 -3.55 1.83 
 (-3.18) (-3.58) (0.54) (-3.14) (-3.05) (-1.01) (-1.87) (-2.40) (1.25) 
          
R² 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.13 
 
 
20  The sentiment index is on Wurgler’s website: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler /. 
21  Given that data for Wurgler’s sentiment is only available until 09/2015 the observation period in this section 
ends in the same month. 
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Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Momentum with Controls 
 Full Low BW Sentiment High BW Sentiment 
 6 Mo Year 1 Year 2 6 Mo Year 1 Year 2 6 Mo Year 1 Year 2 
          
Momentum 4.07 5.31 -4.85 2.17 0.38 -3.73 5.90 10.61 -5.91 
 (2.35) (2.04) (-3.26) (0.69) (0.09) (-2.33) (4.26) (5.14) (-2.58) 
MOMxHOVN -2.17 -3.57 0.91 -2.66 -3.89 -0.52 -1.67 -3.09 2.27 
 (-3.83) (-4.55) (0.98) (-3.37) (-3.83) (-0.60) (-2.06) (-2.47) (1.59) 
BETA -0.26 -0.65 -0.57 0.09 -0.06 -1.30 -0.86 -1.60 0.14 
 (-0.55) (-0.95) (-0.88) (0.12) (-0.05) (-2.15) (-1.73) (-2.68) (0.14) 
SZ -0.28 -0.65 -0.20 -0.54 -1.24 -0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.31 
 (-1.60) (-2.27) (-0.79) (-2.38) (-3.36) (-0.32) (0.38) (0.04) (-0.84) 
BM 1.75 3.10 1.98 0.60 1.13 2.46 3.01 5.07 1.49 
 (4.53) (4.46) (3.66) (1.50) (1.54) (4.23) (5.52) (5.35) (2.08) 
OP 0.76 1.57 1.28 0.75 1.61 1.33 0.80 1.51 1.22 
 (6.54) (7.47) (5.73) (4.08) (5.17) (5.05) (6.57) (6.83) (4.18) 
INV -1.65 -2.17 -1.37 -0.59 -0.73 -2.63 -2.59 -3.24 -0.15 
 (-3.70) (-2.37) (-1.83) (-0.92) (-0.54) (-4.89) (-5.11) (-3.35) (-0.12) 
          
R² 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.13 
 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and associated Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in 
parentheses) from monthly firm-level cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s six-month, first-year or second-year return after the portfolio formation. Momentum is the 
cumulative prior six-month stock return, skipping the most recent month. HOVN is a dummy variable 
based on the monthly overnight return in the formation month. HOVN is equal to one if a firm’s 
overnight return is in the top 20% for a given month and zero otherwise. The full sample covers the 
whole observation period (see Table 4.1). Low (high) BW sentiment samples cover all month with a 
Baker and Wurgler sentiment value in the previous month below (above) the median of all months 
between July 1992 and September 2015. In the regressions, SZ and BM are measured in natural logs. 
R² is adjusted for degrees of freedom.  Panel A reports results for momentum and the interaction term 
(MOMxHOVN). Panel B contains additional results for the full set of independent controls (see Table 
4.3). 
 
To test whether the firm-specific sentiment measure has explanatory power above and 
beyond the already known sentiment measures we take a closer look at the two subsamples 
here. First, analyzing the periods with low BW sentiment, we find that there is no momentum 
for the observed periods but our firm-specific measure is still significantly negative within 
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the 6- and 12-months periods.22 Thus, even in cycles of low BW sentiment, we find that our 
measure has predictive power and yields significantly negative future returns for overpriced 
stocks. Second, periods of high BW sentiment display strong and highly significant 
momentum returns within the international sample but even in this subsample we have a 
negative interaction term of -1.69% for the first six months that leads towards significance 
(t-statistic of -1.87) and a significantly negative value for the 12-month period of -3.55% (t-
statistic of -2.40). These results demonstrate that even in a positive market-wide BW 
sentiment, a firm-specific sentiment can determine mispriced stocks.  
For the sake of completeness, we also provide results with the full set of common controls in 
Panel B of Table 4.6. The results are briefly summarized and strongly correspond with the 
results of Panel A. Our international firm-specific sentiment measure has predictive power 
for six-month and 12 month holding periods among the full observation period as well as the 
two subsamples. 
Taken together, the results in this section strongly support the suitability of overnight returns 
as a sentiment measure and demonstrate the practical applicability of a firm-specific investor 
sentiment measure. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific sentiment 
measure in equity markets outside the United States. We provide strongly supportive out-of-
sample evidence on the previous U.S. findings by Aboody et al. (2018) using a broad sample 
of international equity markets during the time period 1992-2017. 
To verify the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific sentiment measure three 
requirements have to be fulfilled. First, we find pervasive evidence of significant persistence 
in overnight returns in the short-run even after controlling for a large set of established return 
 
22  In line with prior U.S. findings of Antoniou et al. (2013), they find that momentum arises only in positive 
sentiment periods. 
Chapter 4   Overnight Returns: An International Sentiment Measure 
 
 
85 
predictors, such as beta, firm size, book-to-market, profitability, investment, and momentum. 
Second, studying the observed overnight return persistence in combination with harder-to-
value characteristics, we find that the persistence is stronger among firms that are objectively 
harder to value. Specifically, we follow Aboody et al. (2018) and categorize stocks that are 
small, have a high book-to-market ratio (as a measure of growth), a low profitability, a high 
past return volatility, or are young as harder-to-value. The third condition is that stocks with 
high overnight returns show a long-term reversal in close-to-close returns. For a period of up 
to three years, stocks with high short-term overnight returns yield significantly negative 
returns in comparison to stocks with low overnight returns, this corroborates a mispricing-
based explanation. 
Implementing overnight returns as a firm-specific sentiment measure within the momentum 
anomaly, we provide evidence that our sentiment measure possesses predictive power above 
and beyond the well-known market-wide sentiment index by Baker and Wurgler (2006). As 
a result, this study delivers a practicable method to measure firm-specific investor sentiment 
even outside the United States.  
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Conclusion 
Momentum and sentiment measures are topics of broad interest and the debate about return 
behavior is ongoing. However, international literature on these topics is still scarce. This 
thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining novel momentum, as well as 
sentiment approaches in the broad set of international stock markets. For this purpose, the 
most recent trends and methods in asset pricing are considered and taken into account. 
As a whole, the following research questions are considered in this thesis: Can momentum 
be separated from reversal in international stock markets? Is continuing overreaction a better 
predictor for future returns than past returns? Are overnight returns suitable as a measure of 
international firm specific investor sentiment? Hereafter, each of the three studies that 
contribute to the research questions is summarized briefly. 
In the first study, “Separating Momentum from Reversal in International Stock 
Markets”, a large international sample of 20 non-U.S. equity markets in a period from 1992 
to 2017 is analyzed. Significantly larger momentum profits can be generated within a strategy 
that buys small value winners and sells large growth losers, the MAX strategy. Interestingly, 
the strategy does not suffer from return reversals, even for holding periods up to three years, 
and is robust to common return controls. In contrast, the MIN strategy that buys large growth 
winners and sells small value losers, produces no significant momentum profits, but 
significant return reversals over holding periods beyond one year. The significantly different 
return behavior of the MIN and MAX strategy is attributable to mispricing among momentum 
stocks. The superior performance of the MAX strategy is driven by undervalued winners and 
overvalued losers, while overvalued winners and undervalued losers drive the inferior 
performance of the MIN strategy. 
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The second study, “Continuing Overreaction: European Evidence”, investigates the U.S. 
findings of Byun et al. (2016) that a continuing overreaction measure can predict future stock 
returns in the broad cross-section of European firms drawn from 15 developed equity markets 
over the sample period from 1992 to 2017. A significantly positive relation between firms 
continuing overreaction measure and the subsequent stock return is documented. The 
outperformance of companies with high CO over companies with low CO is not captured by 
established cross-sectional return determinants e.g., firm size, book-to-market and 
momentum as well as novel controls like profitability and investment. In addition, the 
premium is also present within different business conditions, as market volatility, market 
states, investor sentiment, market liquidity, default spread, and the NBER recession indicator. 
In depth, the novel CO measure earns a significantly positive return premium over a holding 
period of one year that does not suffer from reversal as a standard momentum approach does 
in the subsequent years.  
Investigating a large international sample of 20 non-U.S. equity markets in a period from 
1992 to 2017, the third study, “Overnight Returns: An International Sentiment 
Measure”, finds strong evidence that overnight returns are suitable as a firm-specific 
sentiment measure. Overnight returns fulfill three characteristics that would be expected of a 
sentiment measure. First, overnight returns persist in the short run. Second, this persistence 
is stronger among harder-to-value firms. And third, stocks with high overnight returns 
underperform in the long run. The short-term persistence is not subsumed by established 
cross-sectional return determinants and is even pervasive across time and different regions. 
Equally, the stronger persistence among harder-to-value firms is still economically and 
statistically significant with the full set of control variables. Finally, when implementing 
overnight returns as a firm-specific sentiment measure, for instance within the momentum 
anomaly, there is explanatory power even beyond the market-wide sentiment measure by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
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Given the magnitude of momentum and reversal research and its continuing risk vs. 
mispricing debate, this dissertation gives valuable new insights. It also tackles substantial 
research topics regarding the popularity of investor sentiment and its role in explaining 
behavior-motivated asset pricing anomalies. Several implications can be derived for 
investors as well as for empirical finance literature. 
Investors that focus on momentum strategies as one of the most examined return anomalies 
in empirical finance benefit when they separate momentum stocks from stocks that gain 
reversal. Due to the simple facts that a reallocation within a standard momentum approach is 
costly and the exact timing of the reallocation is hard, investors benefit from the novel 
approach. Given that the strategy gains significant abnormal returns over a holding period up 
to three years, investors can hold their stocks for the given period and save reallocation costs. 
The finding that the different return behavior of the two strategies is the result of a rather 
systematic exploitation of existing mispricing among momentum, plays an important role 
and sheds further light on the debate between risk-based or mispricing-based explanations 
and provides promising approaches for prospective research.  
Further practical implication benefits are provided by the continuing overreaction measure 
and its superiority over the standard momentum approach. The advantages for investors are 
obvious due to a higher return premium and scarcer portfolio reallocation. 
On the other hand, the suitability of overnight returns as a firm-specific investor sentiment 
measure, is important to both, researchers and investors. Overnight returns provide a more 
direct measure at the firm-level than a market-wide sentiment measure. This measure does 
not require any special datatype, which for instance is only available for the U.S. market. 
Therefore, the suitability of overnight returns as a measure of firm-specific sentiment offers 
the possibility of a comprehensive sentiment measure on international stock markets without 
data adoptions that can be implemented by institutional as well as retail investors. Against 
the background that literature on overnight returns is quite young and international evidence 
is scarce, further research is welcome.   
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